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Private or confidential information is used in a wide variety of applica-
tions, not just including implementations of cryptographic algorithms but also
including machine-learning libraries, databases, and parsers. However, even
after using techniques such as encryption, authentication, and isolation, it is
difficult to maintain the privacy or confidentiality of such information due to
so-called side channels, with which attackers can infer sensitive information by
monitoring program execution. Various side channels exist such as execution
time, power consumption, exceptions, or micro-architectural components such
as caches and branch predictors, and such side channels have been used to
steal intellectual property, financial information, and sensitive document con-
tents. Although numerous solutions exist for closing side channels, they are
point solutions, since each solution closes an isolated set of side channels.
vi
In this dissertation, we present three compiler-based solutions—Raccoon,
Escort, and Vantage—for closing digital side channels (such as the cache, ad-
dress trace, and branch predictor side channels) that carry information over
discrete bits, and for mitigating the a non-digital side channel, specifically, the
power side channel. Additionally, our compilers are customizable, since they
permit the defense to be tailored to the threat model, to the program, and to
the microarchitecture.
More broadly, our solutions augment the compiler with information
about the lower layers of the computing stack, so that the compiler is aware
of potential side channels and so that the compiler can rewrite programs to
avoid leaking information through those side channels. In doing so, our so-
lutions define new abstractions that enable the compiler to reason about the
program’s impact on timing, power consumption, and other similar side chan-
nels. Through such abstractions, our compilers detect and prevent a broad set
of digital and non-digital leakage on modern microarchitectures.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Private or confidential information is used by a wide variety of appli-
cations including machine-learning libraries, which analyze personal browsing
histories to recommend products [60], social networking tools, which analyze
graphs that represent connections between persons [82], and cloud services
(such as online maps), which provide directions based on the location of their
users [74]. Unfortunately, it is difficult to keep all of this sensitive information
private, because although there exist many techniques such as encryption, ac-
cess control, and isolation to prevent the accidental disclosure or leakage of
sensitive information, these techniques are not sufficient. In particular, attack-
ers can steal sensitive information through so-called side channels, which are
means by which an attacker can monitor program execution to reveal sensitive
information in the program.
To understand side channels, consider the program shown in Figure 1.1,
where the code emits a sound ping if secret is zero and it emits a sound pong
otherwise. Given such a program, an attacker who hears the sound ping knows
that secret must be equal to zero. Similarly, if the attacker hears the sound
pong, then she knows that the secret must be not equal to zero. Thus the
1
 if (secret == 0) {
 } else {
 }
PING
PONG
Figure 1.1: Code fragment to demonstrate side channels.
presence or absence of the ping or pong sounds inadvertently leaks the value
of the secret variable, and hence the audible sounds become side channels.
Although programs do not typically emit audible sounds, they usually exhibit
many kinds of variations that produce the same effect of leaking sensitive
information.
More formally, a side channel is any variation in a system’s behavior,
such that the variation is (1) is visible to an attacker and (2) dependent on sen-
sitive information. Thus, the variations reveal sensitive values, thus becoming
side channels of sensitive information.
Numerous side channels exist, including execution time, memory access,
instruction count, cache behavior, DRAM address trace, power consumption,
and electromagnetic radiation. Side-channel attacks are significant because
attackers have used side channels to break AES [80] and RSA [83] encryption
schemes, to break the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [50], to fingerprint software
libraries [123], and to reverse-engineer commercial processors [53].
2
 if (secret == 0) {
   x <- load ptr_1   // 5 cycles
   y <- load ptr_2   // 5 cycles
 } else {
   NOP   // 1 cycle
   NOP   // 1 cycle
 }
10
then
2
else
Figure 1.2: In a point solution that adds dummy NOP instructions to ensure
that the instruction count does not leak information, the execution time can
still leak information. A different point solution that adds NOP instructions to
balance the execution time will need to add many more NOP instructions in
the else path, thus breaking the security guarantee of the former defense.
1.1 Inadequacy of Prior Solutions
Numerous solutions exist for closing side channels [33, 34, 49, 61, 62, 65,
66, 73, 93, 96, 97, 99, 105, 108, 111, 112, 117–119], and we compare our solutions
against them in Section 2.4 (Related Work). However, the common charac-
teristic across these prior solutions is that they are point solutions, since they
each close an isolated set of side channels. Consequently, there exist separate
solutions for closing the execution time side channel [66, 73, 94], separate solu-
tions for the branch predictor side channel [25, 56, 73], for the DRAM address
trace side channel [4, 8, 61, 62], and so on.
Point solutions suffer from two major drawbacks, which we describe
below.
Lack of Composability. Point solutions do not always compose with each
3
 if (secret == 0) {
   x <- load ptr_1
   y <- load ptr_2
 } else {
   z <- load ptr_3
   d <- load dummy
 }
Figure 1.3: A point solution that adds a dummy load instruction (to hide
variations in the number of runtime load instructions) is susceptible to compiler
optimizations (like Dead Code Elimination) which will break the solution’s
security guarantees.
other. More precisely, the use of one point solution can break the security
guarantees of another point solution. Moreover, arguing about security
can be difficult when multiple point solutions are combined. For instance,
consider a cache side-channel defense that randomly evicts cache lines so
as to confuse an adversary monitoring the cache usage [63, 111]. Such a
defense cannot be easily and securely composed with a DRAM address
trace side-channel defense which expects a predictable stream of memory
requests from the CPU [61]. As another example, Figure 1.2 shows
how a defense for the instruction count side channel breaks the security
guarantee of a defense for the execution time side channel.
Disabled Optimizations. Since optimizations can break the security guar-
antees of point solutions, the use of point solutions can force us to signif-
icantly re-engineer compilers and microarchitectures. For instance, con-
sider a solution that adds dummy load instructions to hide variations in
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the load instruction count [61], as shown in Figure 1.3. Unfortunately,
common compiler optimizations such as Dead Code Elimination, Loop
Invariant Code Motion, and Instruction Combining interfere with the
desired security guarantees so such a point solution is forced to disable
many compiler optimizations. The same point solution is also vulnera-
ble to microarchitectural optimizations such as caches, since a dummy
load instruction could consume a different execution time than a real
load instruction. Several other microarchitectural optimizations such
as prefetchers, branch prediction, and variable-latency instructions also
break the security guarantee of this point solution. Consequently, the
use of point solutions can require hardware vendors to design new sig-
nificantly slower hardware to support these side-channel defenses.
Ultimately, point solutions represent a patchwork approach, whose se-
curity is difficult to assert in the presence of other point solutions and in
the presence of common optimizations. Consequently, point solutions are ex-
tremely limited in not just the number of side channels that they can close,
but also in the kinds of programs and the kinds of microarchitectures that
they can protect. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a number of point solutions have
been evaluated using only small cryptographic kernels [56, 63, 100, 114, 121],
such as implementations of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), or on pro-
grams using only simple control flow [7, 61, 62, 79], thus ruling out loops and
floating-point arithmetic operations.
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1.2 Key Contributions of Our Research
In this dissertation, we present three compiler-based solutions—Raccoon [87],
Escort [88], and Vantage [89]—for closing a broad class of side channels. Al-
though our solutions cannot close speculation-based side channels, our Rac-
coon and Escort compilers close digital side channels, which are side channels
that carry information over discrete bits (e.g. cache, address trace, branch
predictor, instruction count, etc.), and our Vantage compiler augments ex-
isting solutions for closing non-digital side channels, specifically, the power side
channel, to protect a more diverse set of applications compared to prior work.
Our solutions are compatible with microarchitectural optimizations such as
caching, prefetching, branch prediction, and out-of-order execution, and our
solutions leverage the flexibility of software (i.e. the compiler) for tailoring
the defense according to the program, the microarchitecture, and the threat
model.
At a high level, our solutions assume that the attacker cannot bypass
the memory and register-level isolation that is typically expected to be en-
forced by the underlying hardware (either through the Memory Management
Unit or through enclaves such as Intel Software Guard Extensions [71]), and
our solutions assume that the memory contents are encrypted. Since our solu-
tions are built in the compiler, they assume that the source code is available.
Consequently, our solutions cannot transform code fragments that contain sys-
tem calls or library calls, since their definition is outside the purview of the
compiler. We describe the assumptions made by our solutions in greater detail
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in the following chapters.
1.3 Key Insight Used in Our Research
In our solutions, we use our insight that a broad class of side chan-
nels are caused due to variations in the source-level behavior of the program.
For instance, the branch predictor and branch target buffer side channels are
caused by differences in the outcome of conditional branches in the program.
Similarly, the cache, TLB, and DRAM address trace side channels are caused
due to differences in pointer dereferences in the program.
Since such source-level variations can be summarized in terms of con-
trol flows and data flows, our solutions eliminate a broad class of side channels
by making the program’s control flows and data flows independent of the pro-
gram’s sensitive information. Conceptually, our solutions execute all paths
and access all memory locations in the program. For instance, for the code
fragment shown in Figure 1.1, our solutions force the evaluation of both the
then path as well as the else path of the branch, so that the adversary’s view
in terms of different side channels in always the same regardless of the value
of the secret variable. Our solutions prevent an explosion in the number of
executed paths and accessed memory locations by (1) identifying the instruc-
tions that are common to various paths and executing them only once and
(2) by limiting our focus to only those parts of the program that potentially
leak sensitive information.
Of course, side channels can also exist in the execution of individual as-
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sembly instructions, so a program whose control flows and data flows are inde-
pendent of sensitive information could still leak information. To prevent such
leakage, our solutions rewrite the operation of specific assembly instruction us-
ing other (safe) assembly instructions. We generate such rewritten operations
either manually or by leveraging results from an existing superoptimizer.
1.4 Organization of This Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we
describe an overview of our approach, our threat model, the limitations of
our approach, and related work. In Chapter 3, we explain our solution for
closing side channels caused due to differences in the source-level behavior
of the application. Chapter 4 describes our approach for closing side chan-
nels arising from the use of variable-latency floating-point operations, along
with an optimized technique for preventing information leakage due to control
flows. In Chapter 5, we describe our technique for enabling the compiler to
mitigate analog side channels, specifically the power side channel, in diverse
applications. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes before highlighting potential future
work.
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Chapter 2
Overview of This Dissertation
This chapter describes the key ideas used in this dissertation, the threat
model, limitations of our approach, and related work.
2.1 Key Ideas
Broadly, our solutions build abstractions from compiler-level instruc-
tions to side-channel observations, thus enabling the compiler to reason about
potential information leakage in the program through side channels. We build
such abstractions by analyzing the underlying layers of the computing stack
(i.e. the ISA, the microarchitecture, and the physical hardware). Specifically,
we apply information flow analysis to determine how sensitive information in
registers and memory locations can leak through metrics such as timing, ex-
ceptions, power, etc. Using such abstractions from compiler-level instructions
to side-channel observations, our solutions both identify potential leakage and
transform programs to prevent the adversary from inferring sensitive informa-
tion despite the existence of side channels.
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Compiler
Abstract Machine
(int ops, cmov)
Abstract Machine
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Abstract Machine
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power model)
Vantage
Compiler
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Concrete Machine
(Out-of-Order Core with
caches, prefetchers, etc.)
Figure 2.1: Our compilers map various programming constructs to instructions
of an abstract machine. We derive the abstract machine by analyzing various
ISAs and microarchitectures.
Abstract Models for Computational Non-Interferences. In this dis-
sertation, we construct and leverage three main abstract models for imple-
menting computational non-interference. First, our Raccoon compiler uses the
conditional move instruction in x86 ISAs to protect integer applications from
digital side channels. Effectively, the Raccoon compiler maps various program
constructs onto an abstract machine that supports a secure register-level con-
ditional move instruction. Consequently, Raccoon assumes that the concrete
machine’s microarchitectural implementation of the register-level conditional
move instruction does not leak information.
Our Escort compiler, which closes digital side channels arising in floating-
point applications, uses an extended abstract machine. Specifically, in addition
to assuming a secure implementation of the conditional move instruction, it
assumes that SIMD operations that use subnormal values execute in paral-
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lel, so that dummy subnormal operations in spare lanes force floating-point
operations to consume a fixed, worst-case latency. Although our concrete ma-
chine (an Intel Sandy Bridge processor) exhibits a ∼1-cycle standard deviation
([88], Table 5) in execution latency despite the use of SIMD operations, this
variation is substantially lower than the ∼58-cycle standard deviation among
non-secure operations. On the other hand, if the concrete machine is built
to match the abstract machine’s specifications (i.e. the SIMD operations that
use subnormal values indeed execute in parallel), then the Escort compiler’s
guarantees are complete.
Finally, our Vantage compiler leverages an abstract machine in which
fine-grain power variations are eliminated using existing hardware techniques,
thus enabling the compiler to eliminate coarse-grain power variations.
Formal Notation. We illustrate our solutions’ generalized approaches for
code transformation in the context of a computation function f that we wish
to protect from side-channel leakage. Specifically, f : I → O, i.e. the function
f accepts inputs I and produces outputs O. By applying the previously-
derived abstraction, α (from the compiler-level instructions to the side-channel
observations), to each instruction inside the function f , we arrive at a leakage
function l which maps the program’s inputs to side-channel observations. More
precisely, l : I → S, i.e. the function l accepts inputs I and produces side-
channel observations S. The adversary’s goal is to infer the input based on
the side-channel observations, whereas our solutions’ goal is to rewrite the
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I
inputs
S
side channel
observations
Figure 2.2: If the input set can be partitioned based on the distinct side-
channel observations, then we can evaluate the user’s computation on only one
input per partition instead of evaluating it once for each input, thus reducing
the performance impact.
function f so that the adversary’s inference is impossible.
We now describe the three broad approaches used by our solutions.
Iterating Over All Inputs. A naive solution to hide sensitive input despite
the occurrence of side channels is to evaluate the computation function f
on all inputs I, regardless of the desired sensitive input. By doing so, the
adversary’s view in terms of side channels is always identical regardless
of the actual input. Of course, if the set of inputs I is large, then this
approach is too expensive.
Iterating Over Partitioned Inputs. Depending on the abstraction α, it
may be possible to partition the set of inputs I such that inputs that
cause identical side-channel observations are grouped into the same par-
tition. Figure 2.2 illustrates this condition, where inputs are partitioned
into two sets based on the distinct side-channel observations. In such
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the leakage function of a computation whose inputs
result in an identical side-channel observation.
cases, our solutions evaluate the computation function f only once per
partition instead of once for each input, thus improving performance.
Rewriting to Eliminate Leakage. In some cases, it may also be possible to
transform the computation function f into another function f ′, such that
f ′ is functionally equivalent to f , but the side-channel observations of f ′
are always identical regardless of the input. In other words, f ′ : I → O
and l′ : I → S ′, where l′ is the leakage function for f ′ and |S ′| = 1.
Figure 2.3 illustrates this case. If it is possible to derive such a function f ′
(for example, using superoptimization), then our solutions simply replace
the computation function f with the function f ′, instead of evaluating
the computation multiple times.
2.2 Threat Model
This section describes our assumptions about the underlying hardware
and software. We assume that the adversary is either an external entity
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that monitors observation-based side channels (e.g. time [50], memory address
trace [43], or the /proc pseudo-filesystem [44]) or a co-resident process/VM
that monitors contention-based side channels (e.g. cache [83] or branch predic-
tor state [2]).
Hardware Assumptions. Our Raccoon and Escort solutions assume that
the adversary can monitor and tamper with any digital signals on the pro-
cessor’s I/O pins. We also assume that the processor is a sealed chip [99].
We assume that the CPU encrypts data transferred to and from DRAM. All
components other than the processor are untrusted, and we assume that the
adversary can observe and tamper with any digital signal. Vantage prevents
an attacker from correlating secrets with the processor’s power consumption
over long sequences of instructions. We assume that the power model analyzed
using Vantage is at least as accurate as the power model that will be used by
the adversary, but Vantage is flexible enough to permit richer power models
as they get developed. The user of Vantage can select the relevant power
model depending on the measurement techniques available to the adversary,
such as physical oscilloscope probes used in the vicinity of the processor or
remotely measured energy-related performance events such as Intel RAPL.
Vantage prevents power and energy variations at the level of instructions
and microcode operations but not cycle-level power variations; we assume that
cycle-level power variations are eliminated using existing techniques such as
Computational Blinking [5, 107, 116] or using custom transistors that enforce
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peak power consumption [28, 84, 86, 103, 104]. Vantage then removes vari-
ations in the power consumption at the level of instructions and microcode
operations, effectively complementing (instead of replacing) existing power
channel defenses. Vantage does not protect the DRAM from power channel
attacks. Our solutions assume that there is no speculative execution, since
our approach assumes that the processor executes only those instructions that
eventually commit.
Software Assumptions. We assume that the adversary can run malicious
applications on the same operating system and/or hardware as the victim’s
application. We allow malicious applications to probe the victim application’s
run-time statistics exposed by the operating system (e.g. the stack pointer in
/proc/pid/stat). We assume that the input program is free of errors, i.e.
(1) the program does not contain bugs that will induce application crashes,
(2) the program does not exhibit undefined behavior, and (3) if multi-threaded,
then the program is data-race free. We also assume that the program does not
contain irreducible control flow graphs. Under these assumptions, our solu-
tions do not introduce new termination-channel leaks, and they correctly ob-
fuscate multi-threaded programs. Our solutions statically transform the user
code into an obfuscated binary, so we assume that the adversary has access to
this transformed binary code and to any symbol table and debug information
that may be present. Our solutions do not support all features of the C99
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standard. Specifically, our compilers cannot obfuscate I/O statements1 and
non-local goto statements. Our compilers cannot analyze libraries since their
source code is not available when compiling the end-user’s application. Our
solutions include static analyses that check if the input program contains these
unsupported language constructs. If such constructs are found in the input
program, the program is rejected. Unlike Escort and Vantage, Raccoon does
not prevent information leakage from loop trip counts, since na¨ıvely obfuscat-
ing loop back-edges would create infinite loops. For the same reason, Raccoon
does not obfuscate branches that represent terminal cases of recursive function
calls. However, to address these issues, it is possible to adapt complementary
techniques designed to close timing channels [117], which can limit information
leaks from loop trip counts and recursive function calls. Finally, our solutions
assume that the programmer annotates variables that store sensitive input
values, so that the compiler can identify the parts of the program that need
protection.
2.3 Limitations of Our Approach
Of course, our solutions have limitations, which we now describe.
System Calls, I/O Operations, and Library Calls. Compiler-based so-
lutions cannot transform code that is outside the compiler’s purview.
1Various solutions have been proposed that allow limited use of “transactional” I/O
statements through runtime systems [19], operating systems [85], or the underlying hard-
ware [14].
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Specifically, I/O operations, system calls, and library calls are outside
of the scope of the compiler. I/O operations are perhaps impossible
to hide using our approach. Thus, our solutions are largely limited to
computational kernels.
Programmer Annotations for Discovering Sensitive Inputs. Our approach
relies on the programmer to correctly identify the input variables that
store sensitive information. If the programmer fails to properly iden-
tify all sensitive inputs, then our solutions’ transformations will not
adquately prevent side-channel leakage. Although our solutions could
conservatively assume that all inputs to the program hold sensitive in-
formation, doing so will likely result in poor performance.
Side Channels Caused by Speculation. Speculation-based side channels
such as Spectre and Meltdown cannot be closed by our approach, since
our approach assumes that the processor executes only those instructions
that eventually commit.
Side Channels at the Lowest Levels of the Computing Stack. Although
compiler-based defenses can close side channels that are at the lowest lev-
els of the computing stack, such as power, electromagnetic radiation, and
heat, the efficiency of such solutions is limited, due to both the undecid-
ability of static analyses and also due to the limited interface exposed by
the ISA. For instance, a multiplier unit could leak information about its
operands through the power consumption, but the ISA does not permit
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exerting control over the multiplier’s power consumption.
Design of Compiler Transformations. We manually design the code trans-
formations in our solutions’ compilers. However, given the variety of
threat models and microarchitectures, it is improbable to expect a hu-
man to design each code transformation.
2.4 Related Work
Side-channel attacks through the OS, the underlying hardware, or the
processor’s output pins have been a subject of vigorous research. Formulated
as the “confinement problem” by Lampson in 1973 [54], such attacks have
become relevant for both cloud infrastructures, where the adversary and victim
VMs can be co-resident [91], and for settings where adversaries have physical
access to the processor [65, 123]. We first describe the related work in digital
side channels, before focusing our attention on the power side channel.
2.4.1 Digital Side Channels
Side-Channels through OS and Microarchitecture. Some application-
level information leaks are beyond the application’s control, for example, an
adversary reading a victim’s secrets through the /proc filesystem [44], or a
victim’s floating point registers that are not cleared on a context switch [3].
In addition to such explicit information leaks, implicit flows rely on contention
for shared resources, as observed by Wang and Lee [111] for cache channels
and extended by Hunger et al. [105] to all microarchitectural channels.
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Physical Access Attacks and Secure Processors. Execute-only Mem-
ory (XOM) [101] encrypts portions of memory to prevent the adversary from
reading secret data or instructions from memory. The AEGIS [99] secure pro-
cessor provides the notion of tamper-evident execution (recognizing integrity
violations using a merkle tree) and tamper-resistant computing (preventing an
adversary from learning secret data using memory encryption). Intel’s Soft-
ware Guard Extensions (SGX) [72] create “enclaves” in memory and limit
accesses to these enclaves. Both XOM and SGX are only partially successful
in prevent the adversary from accessing code because an adversary can still
disassemble the program binary that is stored on the disk. In contrast, our
solutions permit release of the transformed code to the adversary. Hence our
solutions never need to encrypt code memory.
Side-Channel Defenses. Decades of prior research have produced numer-
ous defenses against side channels, the vast majority of which close only a
limited number of side channels with a single solution. For instance, numer-
ous solutions exist that close only the cache side channel [27, 52, 111, 112, 119]
or only the address-trace side channel [65, 90, 96, 97]. Raccoon [87] is the first
solution that closes a broad class of side channels—in particular, the set of
digital side channels—with a single solution. Similar to Raccoon, Escort [88]
also closes digital side channels with a single solution, but unlike Raccoon,
Escort focuses on closing floating-point digital side channels, which can arise
from variable latency floating-point instructions and from software implemen-
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tations of floating-point libraries, in which points-to set sizes are typically
small. Given Escort’s narrower focus on floating-point computations, Escort
is faster than Raccoon by an order of magnitude.
Timing Side-Channel Defenses. Prior defenses against timing side-channel
attacks utilize new algorithms [94], compilers [73], runtime systems [66], or se-
cure processors [61]. However, these solutions only address one source of tim-
ing variations—either those that stem from the choice of the algorithm [95] or
those that stem from the microarchitectural design [37]. By contrast, Raccoon
and Escort close timing variations from both sources.
Floating-Point Side-Channel Defenses. Andrysco et al. [7] present
libfixedtimefixedpoint (FTFP), the first software solution for closing the
floating-point timing channel. FTFP has some weaknesses, as we now discuss,
but the main contribution of their paper is the demonstration of the signifi-
cance of this side channel, as they use variable-latency floating-point opera-
tions to break a browser’s same-origin policy and to break differential privacy
guarantees of remote databases. FTFP is a fixed-point library that consists
of 19 hand-written functions that each operates in fixed time, independent
of its inputs. FTFP is slow and imprecise. Cleemput et al. [23] introduce
compiler transformations that convert variable-timing code into fixed-timing
code. Their technique requires extensive manual intervention, applies only to
the division operation, and provides weak security guarantees. Both solutions
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require manual construction of fixed-time code—a cumbersome process that
makes it difficult to support a large number of operations. By contrast, Escort
implements a fixed-time floating-point library, while preventing information
leaks through timing as well as digital side channels. Escort includes a com-
piler that we have used to automate the transformation of 112 floating-point
functions in the Musl standard C library, a POSIX-compliant C library. Escort
also provides precision identical to the standard C library.
2.4.2 Power Side Channel
We now compare our work to prior attempts in closing or mitigating
the power channel.
Transistor-Level Solutions. Sub-cycle power variations in any circuit can
be eliminated at the level of transistors by either normalizing [28, 86, 103, 104]
or randomizing [84] power consumption. Unfortunately, these solutions do not
protect from power variations occurring due to microarchitectural optimiza-
tions including caching, prefetching, variable-latency instructions, and pred-
ication. These solutions also cannot be selectively turned off, so non-secret
programs execute with the same overhead as secret programs. By contrast,
Vantage [89] is a compiler-based solution for eliminating power variations
over long sequences of instructions running on modern processors, and Van-
tage selectively transforms portions of programs based on the programs’ se-
curity requirements. Vantage complements existing transistor-level solutions
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so that a broad-class of programs can be protected from power-channel attacks.
Code Modifications. Several solutions [16, 26, 36, 45, 46, 59] eliminate cycle-
level power variations by manually changing the source code of vulnerable
programs, but they only support programs that execute a fixed sequence of
instructions and which access a fixed set of memory locations in a pre-defined
sequence. Virtual Secure Circuits (VSCs) [22] execute the original program
concurrently with a so-called shadow program comprising of instructions that
are complementary to the original program in such a way that the original
and complementary instructions exercise different paths of logic circuits. Un-
fortunately, VSCs assume tight synchronization between programs running on
separate cores, they require caches and branch predictors to be disabled, and
VSCs are difficult to use with programs containing branches, function calls,
and floating-point arithmetic. Due to these limitations VSCs cannot be run
on modern processors and with a broad class a programs.
Microarchitectural Solutions. Yang [115], Ambrose [6], and May [68, 69]
suggest closing the power channel by adding noise using dynamic voltage and
frequency scaling, out-of-order execution, register renaming, or by randomly
inserting random instructions. Unfortunately, these approaches merely fix
the symptoms of the problem, and they provide weak guarantees for closing
the power channel, since the running time of programs can vary more than
the noise introduced by perturbations. In comparison, our approach removes
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variations in the source code and our evaluation is stronger than the evaluation
used in the above approaches.
Masking or Blinding Secrets. Secrets can be hidden or “blinded”, either
manually [78, 81] or semi-automatically using a compiler [11, 75], by XOR-ing
them with a randomly-generated bit mask. The blinding process effectively
randomizes the power consumption. However, blinding schemes are inherently
limited to a restricted class of application programs, since blinding relies on
specific mathematical properties of the computations. Vantage protects ap-
plications that use conditional branches and floating-point operations using
code transformations. In our approach, we rely on the processor’s ability to
encrypt off-chip communication, thus obviating the need for blinding off-chip
communication.
Analysis of Power Models. Several models [17, 48, 58, 92, 102, 120] of the
processor’s power consumption exist but these models focus on characterizing
the execution of programs for efficiency, whereas in this work, we devise a
technique to eliminate variations in power consumption. More specifically,
we augment the compiler with information about power consumption, so that
the compiler can generate code that consumes constant power regardless of
application secrets. Unlike the regression model by McCann et al. [70], which
models power consumption of instructions, Vantage’s regression model is
based on microarchitectural events, which are more generic than instructions.
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Chapter 3
Closing Side Channels due to Source-Level
Behavior
In this chapter, we describe our solution for closing side channels that
arise due to differences in the source-level behavior of the program. Specifi-
cally, our solution closes digital side channels, which we define as side channels
that carry information over discrete bits. These side channels are visible to
the adversary at the level of both the program state and the instruction set
architecture (ISA). Thus, address traces, cache usage, and data size are ex-
amples of digital side channels, while power draw, electromagnetic radiation,
and heat are not. Portions of this chapter have been published in the 2015
USENIX Security Symposium [87]1.
Over the past five decades, numerous solutions [33, 34, 49, 61, 62, 65, 66,
73, 93, 96, 97, 99, 105, 108, 111, 112, 117–119] have been proposed for defending
against side-channel attacks. Unfortunately, these defenses provide point so-
lutions that leave the program open to other side-channel attacks. Thus, our
1Full citation: Ashay Rane, Calvin Lin, and Mohit Tiwari, “Raccoon: Closing Digital
Side-Channels Through Obfuscated Execution” in USENIX Security Symposium (SEC),
pages 431–446, 2015. The author of this dissertation contributed to this paper by performing
the research, evaluating the solution, and comparing the solution with prior work.
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goal is to instead find a single solution that simultaneously closes a broad class
of side channels.
Our key insight is that digital side channels emerge from variations in
program execution, so while other solutions attempt to hide the symptoms—
for example, by normalizing the number of instructions along two paths of a
branch—we instead attack the root cause by executing extraneous program
paths, which we refer to as decoy paths. Intuitively, after obfuscation, the
adversary’s view through any digital side channel appears the same as if the
program were run many times with different inputs. Of course, we must en-
sure that our system records the output of only the real path and not the
decoy paths, so our solution uses a transaction-like system to update memory.
Furthermore, on the real paths, each store operation first reads the old value
of a memory location before writing the new value, while the decoy paths read
the old value and write the same old value.
The only distinction between real and decoy paths lies in the values
written to memory: Decoy and real paths will write different values, but unless
an adversary can break the data encryption, she cannot distinguish decoy
from real paths by monitoring digital side channels. Our solution does not
defend against non-digital side-channel attacks, because analog side channels
might reveal the difference between the encrypted values that are stored. For
example, a decoy path might “increment” some variable x multiple times, and
an adversary who can precisely monitor some non-digital side channel, such
as power-draw, might be able to detect that the “increments” to x all write
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the same value, thereby revealing that the code belongs to a decoy path.
Nevertheless, our new approach offers several advantages. First, it de-
fends against digital side-channel attacks. Second, it does not require that the
programs themselves be secret, just the data. Third, it obviates the need for
special-purpose hardware. Thus, standard processor features such as caches,
branch predictors and prefetchers do not need to be disabled. Finally, in con-
trast with previous solutions for hiding specific side channels, it places few
fundamental restrictions on the set of supported language features.
This work makes the following contributions:
1. We design a set of mechanisms, embodied in a system that we call Rac-
coon,2 that closes digital side channels for programs executing on com-
modity hardware. Raccoon works for both single- and multi-threaded
programs.
2. We evaluate the security aspects of these mechanisms in several ways.
First, we argue that the obfuscated data- and control-flows are correct
and are always kept secret. Second, we use information flows over infer-
ence rules to argue that Raccoon’s own code does not leak information.
Third, as an example of Raccoon’s defense, we show that Raccoon pro-
tects against a simple but powerful side channel attack through the OS
interface.
2Raccoons are known for their clever ability to break their scent trails to elude predators.
Raccoons introduce spurious paths as they climb and descend trees, jump into water, and
create loops.
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3. We evaluate the performance overhead of Raccoon and find that its over-
head is 8.9× smaller than that of GhostRider, which is the most similar
prior work [61].3 Unlike GhostRider, Raccoon defends against a broad
range of side-channel attacks and places many fewer restrictions on the
programming language, on the set of applicable compiler optimizations,
and on the underlying hardware.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 explains background
information while Section 3.2 describes Raccoon’s guarantees. We then de-
scribe our solution in detail in Section 3.3 before presenting our security eval-
uation and our performance evaluation in Sections 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
We discuss the implications of Raccoon’s design in Section 3.6, and we con-
clude in Section 3.7.
3.1 Background: Memory Trace Obliviousness
GhostRider [61, 62] is a set of compiler and hardware modifications that
transforms programs to satisfy Memory Trace Obliviousness (MTO). MTO
hides control flow by transforming programs to ensure that the memory access
traces are the same no matter which control flow path is taken by the program.
GhostRider’s transformation uses a type system to check whether the program
is fit for transformation and to identify security-sensitive program values. It
3GhostRider [61] was evaluated with non-optimized programs executing on embedded
CPUs, which results in an unrealistically low overhead (∼10×). Our measurements instead
use a modern CPU with an aggressively optimized binary as the baseline.
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also pads execution paths along both sides of a branch so that the length of
the execution does not reveal the branch predicate value.
However, unlike our solutions, GhostRider cannot execute on generally-
available processors and software environments because GhostRider makes
strict assumptions about the underlying hardware and the user’s program.
Specifically, GhostRider (1) requires the use of new instructions to load and
store data blocks, (2) requires substantial on-chip storage, (3) disallows the
use of dynamic branch prediction, (4) assumes in-order execution, and (5) does
not permit use of the hardware cache (it instead uses a scratchpad memory
controlled by the compiler). GhostRider also does not permit the user code to
contain pointers or to contain function calls that use or return secret informa-
tion. By contrast, our solutions run on SGX-enabled Intel processors (SGX
is required to encrypt values on the data bus) and permits user programs to
contain pointers, permits the use of possibly unsafe arithmetic statements, and
allows the use of function calls that use or return secret information.
3.2 System Guarantees
Raccoon protects against digital side-channel attacks. Raccoon guar-
antees that an adversary monitoring the digital signals of the processor chip
cannot differentiate between the real path execution and the decoy path execu-
tions. Even after executing multiple decoy program paths, Raccoon guarantees
the same final program output as the original program.
Raccoon guarantees that its obfuscation steps will not introduce new
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program bugs or crashes, so Raccoon does not introduce new information leaks
over the termination channel.
Assuming that the original program is race-free, Raccoon’s code trans-
formations respect the original program’s control and data dependences. More-
over, Raccoon’s obfuscation code uses thread-local storage. Thus, Raccoon’s
obfuscation technique works seamlessly with multi-threaded applications be-
cause it does not introduce new data dependences.
3.3 Raccoon Design
This section describes the design and implementation of Raccoon from
the bottom-up. We start by describing the two critical properties of Raccoon
that distinguish it from other obfuscation techniques. Then, after describing
the key building block upon which higher-level oblivious operations are built,
we describe each of Raccoon’s individual components: (1) a taint analysis
that identifies program statements that require obfuscation (Section 3.3.3),
(2) a runtime transaction-like memory mechanism for buffering intermediate
results along decoy paths (Section 3.3.4), (3) a program transformation that
obfuscates control-flow statements (Section 3.3.5), and (4) a code transfor-
mation that uses software Path ORAM to hide array accesses that depend
on secrets (Section 3.3.6). We then describe Raccoon’s program transforma-
tions that ensure crash-free execution (Section 3.3.7). Finally, we illustrate
with a simple example the synergy among Raccoon’s various obfuscation steps
(Section 3.3.8).
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1: p← &a;
2: if secret = true then
3: ... . Real path.
4: else
5: ... . Decoy path.
6: p← &b; . Dummy instructions do not update p.
7: ∗p← 10; . Accesses variable a instead of b!
8: end if
Figure 3.1: Illustrating the importance of Property 2. This code fragment
shows how solutions that do not update memory along decoy paths may leak
information. If the decoy path is not allowed to update memory, then the
dereferenced pointer in line 7 will access a instead of accessing b, which reveals
that the statement was part of a decoy path.
3.3.1 Key Properties of Our Solution
Two key properties of Raccoon distinguish it from other branch-obfuscating
solutions [27, 61, 62, 73]:
• Property 1: Both real and decoy paths execute actual program instruc-
tions.
• Property 2: Both real and decoy paths are allowed to update memory.
Property 1 produces decoy paths that—from the perspective of an ad-
versary monitoring a digital side-channel—are indistinguishable from from real
paths. Without this property, previous solutions can close one side-channel
while leaving other side-channels open. To understand this point, we refer
to Figure 3.2 and consider a solution that normalizes execution time along
the two branch paths in the Figure by adding NOP instructions to the Not
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1: function Square And Multiply(m, s, n)
2: z ← 1
3: for bit b in s from left to right do
4: if b = 1 then
5: z ← m · z2 mod n
6: else
7: z ← z2 mod n
8: end if
9: end for
10: return z
11: end function
Figure 3.2: Source code to compute ms mod n.
Taken path. This solution closes the timing channel but introduces different
instruction counts along the two branch paths. On the other hand, the addi-
tion of dummy instructions to normalize instruction counts will likely result
in different execution time along the two branch paths, since (on commodity
hardware) the NOP instructions will have a different execution latency than the
multiply instruction.
Property 2 is a special case of Property 1, but we include it because the
ability to update memory is critical to Raccoon’s ability to obfuscate execution.
For example, Figure 3.1 shows that if the decoy path does not update the
pointer p, then the subsequent decoy statement will update a instead of b,
revealing that the assignment to *p was part of a decoy path.
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01: cmov(uint8_t pred, uint32_t t_val, uint32_t f_val) {
02: uint32_t result;
03: __asm__ volatile (
04: "mov %2, %0;"
05: "test %1, %1;"
06: "cmovz %3, %0;"
07: "test %2, %2;"
08: : "=r" (result)
09: : "r" (pred), "r" (t_val), "r" (f_val)
10: : "cc"
11: );
12: return result;
13: }
Figure 3.3: CMOV wrapper
3.3.2 Oblivious Store Operation
Raccoon’s key building block is the oblivious store operation, which we
implement using the CMOV x86 instruction. This instruction accepts a condition
code, a source operand, and a destination operand; if the condition is true, it
moves the source operand to the destination. When both the source and the
destination operands are in registers, the execution of this instruction does not
reveal information about the branch predicate (hence the name oblivious store
operation).4 As we describe shortly, many components in Raccoon leverage
the oblivious store operation. Figure 3.3 shows the x86 assembly code for the
CMOV wrapper function.
4Contrary to the pseudocode describing the CMOV instruction in the Intel 64 Architecture
Software Developer’s Manual, our assembly code tests reveal that in 64-bit operating mode
when the operand size is 16-bit or 32-bit, the instruction resets the upper 32 bits regardless
of whether the predicate is true. Thus the instruction does not leak the value of the predicate
via the upper 32 bits, as one might assume based on the manual.
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3.3.3 Taint Analysis
Raccoon requires the user to annotate secret variables using the attribute
construct. With these secret variables identified, Raccoon performs inter-
procedural taint analysis to identify branches and data access statements that
require obfuscation. Raccoon propagates taint across both implicit and ex-
plicit flow edges. The result of the taint analysis is a list of memory accesses
and branch statements that must be obfuscated to protect privacy.
3.3.4 Transaction Management
To support Properties 1 and 2, Raccoon executes each branch of an
obfuscated if-statement in a transaction. In particular, Raccoon buffers load
and store operations along each path of an if-statement, and Raccoon writes
values along the real path to DRAM using the oblivious store operation. If
a decoy path tries to write a value to the DRAM, Raccoon uses the oblivious
store operation to read the existing value and write it back. At compile time,
Raccoon transforms load and store operations so that they will be serviced
from the transaction buffers. Figure 3.4 shows pseudocode that implements
transactional loads and stores. Loads and stores that appear in non-obfuscated
code do not use the transaction buffers.
3.3.5 Control-Flow Obfuscation
To obfuscate control flow, Raccoon forces control flow along both paths
of an obfuscated branch, which requires three key facilities: (1) a method of
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// Writes a value to the transaction buffer.
tx_write(address, value) {
if (threaded program)
lock();
// Write to both the transaction buffer
// and to the non-transactional storage.
tls->gl_buffer[address] = value;
*address = cmov(real_idx == instance,
value, *address);
if (threaded program)
unlock();
}
// Fetches a value from the transaction buffer.
tx_read(address) {
if (threaded program)
lock();
value = *address;
if (address in tls->gl_buffer)
value = tls->gl_buffer[address];
value = cmov(real_idx == instance,
*address, value);
if (threaded program)
unlock();
return value;
}
Figure 3.4: Pseudocode for transaction buffer accesses. Equality checks are
implemented using XOR operation to prevent the compiler from introducing an
explicit branch instruction.
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perturbing the branch outcome, (2) a method of bringing execution control
back from the end of the if-statement to the start of the if-statement so that
execution can follow along the unexplored path, and (3) a method of ensur-
ing that memory updates along decoy path(s) do not alter non-transactional
memory. The first facility is implemented by the obfuscate() function (which
forces sequential execution of both paths arising out of a conditional branch
instruction). Although Raccoon executes both branch paths, it evaluates the
(secret) branch predicate only once. This ensures that the execution of the
first path does not unexpectedly change the value of the branch predicate.
The second facility is implemented by the epilog() function (which transfers
control-flow from the post-dominator of the if-statement to the beginning of
the if-statement). Finally the third facility is implemented using the oblivi-
ous store operation described earlier. The control-flow obfuscation functions
(obfuscate() and epilog()) use the libc setjmp() and longjmp() functions
to transfer control between program points.
Safety of setjmp() and longjmp() Operations. The use of setjmp()
and longjmp() is safe as long as the runtime system does not destroy the acti-
vation record of the caller of setjmp() prior to calling longjmp(). Thus, the
function that invokes setjmp() should not return until longjmp() is invoked.
To work around this limitation, Raccoon copies the stack contents along with
the register state (identified by the jmp buff structure) and restores the stack
before calling longjmp(). To avoid perturbing the stack while manipulating
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the stack, Raccoon manipulates the stack using C macros and global variables.
As an additional safety requirement, the runtime system must not re-
move the code segment containing the call to setjmp() from instruction mem-
ory before the call to longjmp(). Because both obfuscate()—which calls
setjmp()—and epilog()—which calls longjmp()—are present in the same
program module, we know that that the code segment will not vanish before
calling longjmp().
Obfuscating Nested Branches. Nested branches are obfuscated in Rac-
coon by maintaining a stack of transaction buffers that mimics the nesting
of transactions. Unlike traditional transactions, transactions in Raccoon are
easier to nest because Raccoon can determine whether to commit the results
or to store them temporarily in the transaction buffer at the beginning of the
transaction (based on the secret value of the branch predicate).
3.3.6 Software Path ORAM
Raccoon’s implementation of the Path ORAM algorithm builds on the
oblivious store operation. Since processors such as the Intel x86 do not have a
trusted memory (other than a handful of registers) for implementing the stash,
we modify the Path ORAM algorithm from its original form [97]. Raccoon’s
Path ORAM implementation cannot directly index into arrays that represent
the position map or the stash, so Raccoon’s implementation streams over the
position map and stash arrays and uses the oblivious store operation to selec-
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tively read or update array elements. Raccoon implements both recursive [96]
as well as non-recursive versions of Path ORAM. Our software implementa-
tion of Path ORAM permits flexible sizes for both the stash memory and the
position map.
Section 3.5.3 compares recursive and non-recursive ORAM implemen-
tations with an implementation that streams over the entire data array. Rac-
coon uses AVX vector intrinsic operations for streaming over data arrays. We
find that even with large data sizes, it is faster to stream over the array than
perform a single ORAM access.
3.3.7 Limiting Termination Channel Leaks
By executing instructions along decoy paths, Raccoon might operate
on incorrect values. For example, consider the statement if (y != 0) { z
= x / y; }. If y = 0 for a particular execution and if Raccoon executes the
decoy path with y = 0, then the program will crash due to a division-by-zero
error, and the occurrence of this crash in an otherwise bug-free program would
reveal that the program was executing a decoy path (and, consequently, that
y = 0).
To avoid such situations, Raccoon prevents the program from termi-
nating abnormally due to exceptions. For each integer division that appears in
a transaction (along both real and decoy paths), Raccoon instruments the op-
eration so that it obliviously (using cmov) replaces the divisor with a non-zero
value. To prevent integer division overflow, Raccoon checks whether the divi-
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dend is equal to INT MIN and whether the divisor is equal to -1; if so, Raccoon
obliviously substitutes the divisor to prevent a division overflow. Raccoon also
disables floating point exceptions using fedisableexcept(). Similarly, array
load and store operations appearing on the decoy path are checked (again,
obliviously, using cmov) for out-of-bounds accesses. Thus, to ensure that the
execution of decoy paths does not crash the program, Raccoon patches unsafe
operations. Section 3.4.3 demonstrates that this process of patching unsafe
operations does not leak secret information to the adversary.
3.3.8 Putting It All Together
We now explain how Raccoon transforms the code shown in Figure 3.5.
Here, the secret annotation informs Raccoon that the contents of array are
secret.
Static taint analysis then reveals that the branch predicate (line 2)
depends on the secret value, so Raccoon obfuscates this branch. Similarly,
implicit flow edges from the branch predicate to the two assignment state-
ments (at lines 3 and 5) indicate that Raccoon should use the oblivious store
operation for both assignment statements.
Accordingly, Raccoon replaces direct memory stores for l and r with
function calls that write into transaction buffers in lines 11 and 13 of the trans-
formed pseudocode. The access to array in line 1 is replaced by an oblivious
streaming operation in line 7. Finally, the branch in line 2 is obfuscated by
inserting the obfuscate() and epilog() function calls. The epilog() and
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/* Transformed pseudocode. */
07: r1 = stream_load(array, mid)
08: r2 = r1 <= x
09: key = obfuscate(r2, r3)
10: if r3 {
11:   tx_write(l, mid)
12: } else {
13:   tx_write(r, mid)
14: }
15: epilog(key)
16: ...
/* Sample user code. */
01: int array[512]
      __attribute__((annotate("secret")));
02: if (array[mid] <= x) {
03:   l = mid;
04: } else {
05:   r = mid;
06: }
Load array[mid]
Store comparison result
Runtime Sequence Description
Return 0 on first call,
return 1 on second call
First, execute else path
Return to line 9 on first call, 
return to line 16 on second
Execute then path during 
second execution
Figure 3.5: Sample code and transformed pseudocode.
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obfuscate() function calls are coordinated over the key variable. To pre-
vent the compiler from deleting or optimizing security-sensitive code sections,
Raccoon marks security-sensitive functions, variables, and memory access op-
erations as volatile (not shown in the transformed IR).5
At runtime, the transformed code executes the following steps:
1. Line 7 streams over the array and uses ORAM to load a single element
(identified by mid) of the array.
2. Line 8 calculates the actual value of the branch predicate.
3. The key to this obfuscation lies in the epilog() function on line 15,
which forces the transformed code to execute twice. The first time this
function is called, it transfers control back to line 9. The second time
this function is called, it simply returns, and program execution proceeds
to other statements in the user’s code.
4. Line 9 obfuscates the branch outcome. The first time the obfuscate()
function returns, it stores 0 in r3, and control is transferred to the state-
ment at line 13, where the tx write() function call updates the trans-
action buffer. Non-transactional memory is updated only if this path
corresponds to the real path.
5The C99 standard states that any “any expression referring to [a volatile object] shall be
evaluated strictly according to the rules of the abstract machine”, and the abstract machine
is defined in a manner that considers that “issues of optimization are irrelevant”.
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The second time the obfuscate() function returns, it stores 1 in r3,
and control is transferred to the statement at line 11, again calling
the tx write() function to update the transaction buffer. Again, non-
transactional memory is updated only if this path corresponds to the
real path.
3.4 Security Evaluation
In this section, we first demonstrate that the control-flows and data-
flows in obfuscated programs are correct and that they are independent of the
secret value. Then, using type-rules that track information flows, we argue that
Raccoon’s own code does not leak secret information. We then illustrate Rac-
coon’s defenses against termination channels by reasoning about exceptions in
x86 processors. Finally, we evaluate Raccoon’s ability to prevent side-channel
attacks via the /proc filesystem.
3.4.1 Security of Obfuscated Code
In this section, we argue that the obfuscated control-flows and data-
flows (1) preserve the original program’s dependences and (2) do not reveal any
secret information. We only describe scalar loads and stores, since all array-
loads and array-stores are obfuscated by simply streaming over the array. To
simplify the explanation, the following arguments describe a top-level (i.e. a
non-nested) branch. The same arguments can be extended to nested branches
by maintaining a stack of transaction buffers.
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Correctness of Obfuscated Data-Flow. To ensure correct data-flow, Rac-
coon uses a combination of transaction buffers and non-transactional storage
(i.e. main memory). Raccoon sets up a fresh transaction buffer for each thread
that executes a new path. Figure 3.4 shows the implementation of buffered
load and store operations for use with transactions. The store operations
along real paths write to both transaction buffers and non-transactional stor-
age (since threads cannot share data that is stored in thread-local transaction
buffers).
Consider a non-obfuscated program that stores a value to a memory
location m in line 10 and loads a value from the same location in line 20. We
now consider four possible arrangements of these two load and store opera-
tions in the obfuscated program, where each operation may reside either inside
or outside a transaction. Our goal is to ensure that the load operation always
reads the correct value, whether the correct value resides in a transactional
buffer or in non-transactional storage.
• store outside transaction, load inside transaction: This implies
that there is no store operation on m within the transaction. Thus,
the transaction buffer does not contain an entry for m, and the load
operation reads the value from the non-transactional storage.
• store inside transaction, load inside transaction: Since the trans-
action has previously written to m, the transaction buffer contains an
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entry for m, and the load operation fetches the value from the transac-
tion buffer.
• store inside transaction, load outside transaction: This implies
that the store operation must lie along the real path. Real-path exe-
cution updates non-transactional storage. Since load operations outside
of transactions always fetch from non-transactional storage, the load
operation reads the correct value of m.
• store outside transaction, load outside transaction: Raccoon
does not change load or store operations that are located outside of
the transactions. Hence the non-obfuscated reaching definition remains
unperturbed.
Raccoon correctly obfuscates multi-threaded code as well. In programs
obfuscated by Raccoon, decoy paths only update transactional buffers. Thus,
only the store operations on real path affect reaching definitions of the ob-
fuscated program. Furthermore, store (or load) operations along real path
immediately update (or fetch) non-transactional storage and do not wait until
the transaction execution ends. Thus, memory updates from execution of real
paths are immediately visible to all threads, ensuring that inter-thread depen-
dences are not masked by transactional execution. Finally, all transactional
load and store operations use locks to ensure that these accesses are atomic.
Put together, load and store operations on real paths are atomic and globally-
visible, whereas store operations on decoy paths are only locally-visible and
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get discarded upon transaction termination. We thus conclude that the ob-
fuscated code maintains correct data-flows for both single- and multi-threaded
programs.
Concealing Obfuscated Data-Flow. Raccoon always performs two store
operations for every transactional write operation, regardless of whether the
write operation belongs to a real path or a decoy path. Moreover, by leveraging
the oblivious store operation, Raccoon hides the specific value written to
the transactional buffer or to the non-transactional storage. Although the
tx read() function uses an if-statement, the predicate of the if-statement
is not secret, since an adversary can simply inspect the code and differentiate
between repeated and first-time memory accesses. Thus, we conclude that the
data-flows exposed to the adversary do not leak secret information.
Concealing Obfuscated Control-Flow. Raccoon converts control flow
that depends on secret values into static (i.e. deterministically repeatable)
control-flow that does not depend on secret values. Given a conditional branch
instruction and two branch targets in the LLVM Intermediate Representation
(IR), Raccoon always forces execution along the first target and then the sec-
ond target. Thus, the sequence of executed branch targets depends on the
(static) encoding of the branch instruction and not on the secret predicate.
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Category Functions Secret info.
Control-flow
obfuscation.
obfuscate(),
epilog().
Predicate value
Wrapper functions
for unsafe operations.
stream load(),
stream store(),
div wrapper().
Array index,
division operands.
Registering stack and
array information.
reg memory(),
reg stack base().
-
Initialization and
clean-up functions.
init handler(),
exit handler().
-
Table 3.1: Entry-points of Raccoon’s library.
3.4.2 Security of Obfuscation Code
Raccoon’s own code should never leak secret information, so in this
section, we demonstrate the security of the secret information maintained by
Raccoon. Because the Raccoon code exposes only a handful of APIs (Table 3.1)
to user applications, we can perform a detailed analysis of the code’s entry-
and exit-points to ensure that these interfaces never spill secret information
outside of Raccoon’s own code.
Type System for Tracking Information Flows. Figure 3.6 shows a sub-
set of the typing rules used for checking the IR of Raccoon’s own code. These
rules express small-step semantics that track security labels. We assume the
existence of a functions lr : ν → γ and la : ∆ → γ that map LLVM’s virtual
registers (ν) and addresses (∆) to security labels (γ), respectively. Security
labels can be of two types: L represents low-context (or public) information,
while H represents high-context (or secret) information. Secret information
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T-LOAD
lr(p) = L, A = pts(p),m = max
a∈A
la(a)
〈x = loadp; c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la, lr[x 7→ m]〉
T-STORE
lr(p) = L, A = pts(p)
〈store(x, p); c, la, lr〉 → 〈c,
⋃
a∈A
la[a 7→ max(la(a), lr(x)), lr]〉
T-BINOP 〈v = binary-op(x, y); c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la, lr[v 7→max(lr(x), lr(y))]〉
T-UNOP 〈v = unary-op(x); c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la, lr[v 7→ lr(x)]〉
T-BRANCH
lr(p) = L, 〈ct; c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la′, lr ′〉, 〈cf ; c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la′′, lr ′′〉
〈branch(p, ct, cf ); c, la, lr〉 → 〈c,M(la′, la′′),M(lr ′, lr ′′)〉
T-CMOV 〈v = cmov(p, t, f); c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la, lr[v 7→ L]〉
T-SKIP 〈v = skip; c, la, lr〉 → 〈c, la, lr〉
T-SEQUENCE
〈c0, la, lr〉 → 〈c0′, la′, lr ′〉
〈c0; c1, la, lr〉 → 〈c0′; c1, la′, lr ′〉
M(l′, l′′) = ∀x ∈ {K(l′) ∪ K(l′′)} (x, max(l′(x), l′′(x))) K(l) = {x | (x, s) ∈ l}
Figure 3.6: Typing rules and supporting functions that check security of Rac-
coon’s code.
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listed in Table 3.1 is assigned the H security label, while all other information
is assigned the L security label. We also assume the existence of a function
pts : r → {∆} that returns the points-to set for a given virtual register r.
Our goal is to ensure that Raccoon does not leak secret information
either through control-flow (branch instructions) or data-flow (load and store
instructions). The typing rules in Figure 3.6 verify that information labeled as
secret never appears as an address in a load or store instruction and never
appears as a predicate in a branch instruction. Otherwise, the typing rules
would result in a stuck transition. To prevent information leaks, Raccoon
passes the secret information through the declassifier (cmov) before executing
a load, store, or branch operation with a secret value. Due to its oblivious
nature, the cmov operation resets the security label of its destination to L.
Security Evaluation of the cmov Operation. The tiny code size of the
cmov operation (Figure 3.3) permits us to thoroughly inspect each instruction
for possible information leaks. We use the Intel 64 Architecture Software
Developer’s Manual to understand the side-effects of each instruction.
Since the code operates on the processor registers only and never ac-
cesses memory, it operates within the (trusted) boundary of the sealed pro-
cessor chip. The secret predicate is loaded into the %1 register. The mov
instruction in line 4 initializes the destination register with t val. The test
instruction at line 5 checks if pred is zero and updates the Zero flag (ZF), Sign
flag (SF), and the Parity flag (PF) to reflect the comparison. The subsequent
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cmovz instruction copies f val into the destination register only if pred is
zero. At this point, ZF, SF, and PF still contain the results of the compari-
son. The test instruction at line 7 overwrites these flags by comparing known
non-secret values.
Since none of the instructions ever accesses memory, these instruc-
tions can never raise a General Protection Fault, Page Fault, Stack Excep-
tion Fault, Segment Not Present exception, or Alignment Check exception.
None of these instructions uses the LOCK prefix, so they will never gener-
ate an Invalid Opcode (#UD) exception. As per the Intel Software Devel-
oper’s Manual, the above instructions cannot raise any other exception be-
sides the ones listed above. Through a manual analysis of the descriptions
of 253 performance events6 supported by our target platform, we discov-
ered that only two performance events are directly relevant to the code in
Figure 3.3: PARTIAL RAT STALLS.FLAGS MERGE UOP and UOPS RETIRED.ALL.
The first event (FLAGS MERGE UOP), which counts the number of performance-
sensitive flags-merging micro-operations, produces the same value for our code,
no matter whether the predicate is true or false. The second event (UOPS RETIRED.ALL)
counts the number of retired micro-operations. Since details of micro-operation
counts for x86 instructions are not publicly available, we used an unofficial
source of instruction tables7 to verify that the micro-operation count for a
cmov instruction is independent of the instruction’s predicate. We thus con-
6Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software Developers Manual, Section 19.5.
7http://www.agner.org/optimize/instruction_tables.pdf
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Category Interrupt list
Arithmetic errors
Division by zero, invalid operands,
overflow, underflow, inexact results.
Memory access
interrupts
Stack exception fault,
general protection fault, page fault.
Debugging interrupts Single-step, breakpoint.
Privileged operations Invalid TSS, segment not present.
Coprocessor (legacy)
interrupts
No coprocessor, coprocessor overrun,
coprocessor error.
Other
Non-maskable interrupt,
invalid opcode, double-fault abort.
Table 3.2: Categorized list of x86 hardware exceptions.
clude that the code in Figure 3.3 does not leak the secret predicate value.
3.4.3 Termination Leaks
In Section 3.3.7, we explained how Raccoon patches division operations
and memory access instructions to prevent the program from crashing along
decoy paths. We now explain why these patches are sufficient in preventing
the introduction of new termination leaks. Table 3.2 shows a categorized list
of exception conditions arising in Intel x86 processors8 that may terminate
programs. Among these interrupts, Raccoon transparently handles arithmetic
and memory access interrupts.
Debugging interrupts are irrelevant for the program safety discussion
because they do not cause the program to terminate. Our threat model does
not apply obfuscation to OS or kernel code. Since we do not expect user
programs to contain privileged instructions, Raccoon does not need to mask
8http://www.x86-64.org/documentation/abi.pdf
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interrupts from privileged operations. Coprocessor interrupts are relevant to
Numeric Processor eXtensions (NPX), which are no longer used today. Non-
maskable interrupts are not caused by software events and thus need not be
hidden by Raccoon. Branches in Raccoon always jump to the start of valid
basic blocks, so invalid opcodes can never occur in an obfuscated version of
a correct program. A double-fault exception occurs when the processor en-
counters an exception while invoking the handler for a previous exception.
Aborts due to double-fault need not be hidden by Raccoon because none of
the primary exceptions in an obfuscated program will leak secret information.
In conclusion, Raccoon prevents abnormal program termination, thus guaran-
teeing that Raccoon’s execution of decoy paths will never cause information
leaks over the termination channel.
3.4.4 Defense Against Side-Channel Attacks
We have argued in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 that Raccoon closes digital
side-channels. We now show a concrete example of a simple but powerful
side-channel attack, and we use basic machine-learning techniques to visually
illustrate Raccoon’s defense against this attack. We model the adversary as a
process that observes the instruction pointer (IP) values of the victim process.
Both the victim process and the adversary process run on the same machine.
The driver process starts the victim process and immediately pauses the
victim process by sending a SIGSTOP signal. The driver process then starts
the adversary process and sends it the process ID of the paused victim
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Figure 3.7: Confusion matrices for ip-resolv, find-max and tax. The top
matrices describe original execution. The bottom matrices describe obfuscated
execution.
process. This adversary process polls for the instruction pointer of the victim
process every 5ms via the kstkeip field in /proc/pid/stat. When the victim
process finishes execution, the driver process sends a SIGINT signal to the
adversary process, signalling it to save its collection of instruction pointers
to a file. We run the victim programs with various secret inputs and each
run produces a (sampled) trace of instruction pointers. Each such trace is
labelled with the name of the program and an identifier for the secret input.
We collect 300 traces for each label. For the sake of brevity, we show results
for only three programs from our benchmark suite.
The labelled traces are then passed through a Support Vector Machine
for k-fold cross-validation (we choose k = 10) using LIBSVM v3.18. Using
the prediction data, we construct a confusion matrix for each program, which
conveys the accuracy of a classification system by counting the number of
correctly-predicted and mis-predicted values (see Figure 3.7). The confusion
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Name Lines Data size
Classifier 86 5 features, 5 records
IP resolver 247 3,500 records
Medical risk analysis 92 3,200 records
CRC32 76 10 KB
Genetic algorithm 446 pop. size = 1 KB
Tax calculator 350 -
Radix sort 675 256K elements
Binary search 35 10K elements
Dijkstra 50 1K edges
Find max 27 1K elements
Heap add 24 1K elements
Heap pop 42 10K elements
Histogram 40 1K elements
Map 29 1K elements
Matrix multiplication 28 500 x 500 values
Table 3.3: Benchmark programs used for performance evaluation of Raccoon.
The bottom eight programs are also used to evaluate GhostRider. The re-
maining seven programs cannot be transformed by GhostRider because these
programs use pointers and invoke functions in the secret context.
matrices show that for the non-secure executions, the classifier is able to label
instruction pointer traces with high accuracy. By contrast, when using traces
from obfuscated execution, the classifier’s accuracy is significantly lower.
3.5 Performance Evaluation
Methodology. Raccoon is implemented in the LLVM compiler framework
v3.6. In our test setup, the host operating system is CentOS 6.3. To evaluate
performance, we use 15 programs (eight small kernels and seven small appli-
cations). Table 3.3 summarizes their characteristics and the associated input
data sizes. The bottom eight programs in the table are the same programs
used to evaluate GhostRider [61, 62], and we use these to compare Raccoon’s
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overhead against that of GhostRider. To simplify the comparison between
Raccoon and GhostRider, we use data sizes that are similar to those used
to evaluate GhostRider [61]. Raccoon uses the attribute construct to
mark secret variables—which mandates that the input programs are written
in C/C++. However the rest of Raccoon operates entirely on the LLVM IR
and does not use any source-language features. Thus, Raccoon can easily be
ported to work with any language that can be compiled to the LLVM IR. All
tests use the LLVM/Clang compiler toolchain.
We run all experiments on a machine with two Intel Xeon (Sandy
Bridge) processors and with 32 GB (8 × 4 GB) DDR3 memory. Each pro-
cessor has eight cores with 256 KB private L2 caches. The eight cores on
a processor chip share a 20 MB L3 cache. Streaming encryption/decryption
hardware makes the cost of accessing memory from encrypted RAM banks
almost the same as the cost of accessing a DRAM bank. The underlying hard-
ware does not support encrypted RAM banks, but we do not separately add
any encryption-related overhead to our measurements because the streaming
access cost is almost the same with or without encryption.
Performance measurements of our simulated ORAM use the native
hardware performance event—UNHALTED CORE CYCLES. We measure overhead
using clock gettime(). Our software Path ORAM implementation is config-
ured with a block size of 64 bytes. Each node in the Path ORAM tree stores
10 blocks. The stash size is selected at ORAM initialization time and is set to
ORAM block count
100
or 64 entries, whichever is higher.
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Figure 3.8: Sources of obfuscation overhead.
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Figure 3.9: Overhead comparison on GhostRider’s benchmarks. Even when we
generously underestimate GhostRider’s overhead, GhostRider sees an average
overhead of 195×, while Raccoon’s overhead is 21.8×.
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3.5.1 Obfuscation Overhead
There are two main sources of Raccoon overhead: (1) the cost of
the ORAM operations (or streaming) and (2) the cost of control-flow ob-
fuscation (including the cost of buffering transactional memory accesses, the
cost of copying program stack and CPU registers, and the cost of oblivi-
ously patching arithmetic and memory access instructions). We account for
ORAM/streaming overhead over both real and decoy paths. Of course, the
overhead varies with program characteristics, such as size of the input data,
number of obfuscated statements, and number of memory access statements.
Figure 3.8 shows the obfuscation overhead for the benchmark programs when
compared with an aggressively optimized (compiled with -O3) non-obfuscated
binary executable. The geometric mean of the overhead is ∼16.1×. Applica-
tions closer to the left end of the spectrum had low overheads due to Raccoon’s
ability to leverage existing compiler optimizations (if-conversion, automatic
loop unrolling, and memory to register promotion). In most applications with
high obfuscation overhead, a majority of the overhead arises from transactional
execution in control-flow obfuscation.
3.5.2 Comparison with GhostRider
To place our work in the context of similar solutions to side-channel
defenses, we compare Raccoon with the GhostRider hardware/software frame-
work [61, 62] that implements Memory Trace Obliviousness. This section
focuses on the performance aspects of the two systems, but Raccoon pro-
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vides significant benefits over GhostRider beyond performance. First, Rac-
coon provides a broad coverage against many different side-channel attacks.
Second, the dynamic obfuscation scheme used in Raccoon strengthens the
threat model, since it allows the transformed code to be released to the adver-
sary. Third, Raccoon does not require special-purpose hardware. Finally, since
GhostRider adds instructions to mimic address traces in both branch paths,
it requires that address traces from obfuscated code be known at compile-
time, which significantly limits the programs that GhostRider can obfuscate.
Raccoon relaxes this requirement by executing actual code, so Raccoon can
transform more complex programs than GhostRider.
Methodology. We now describe our methodology for simulating the GhostRider
solution. As with our Raccoon setup, we compare GhostRider’s obfuscated
program with an aggressively optimized (compiled with -O3) non-obfuscated
version of the same program. Various compiler optimizations (dead code elim-
ination, vectorization, constant merging, constant propagation, global value
optimizations, instruction combining, loop-invariant code motion, and promo-
tion of memory to registers) interfere with GhostRider’s security guarantees,
so we disable optimizations for the obfuscated program. We manually apply
the transformations implemented in the GhostRider compiler. We simulate a
processor that is modelled after the GhostRider processor, so we use a single-
issue in-order processor that does not allow prefetching into the cache.
There are four reasons why our methodology significantly underesti-
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mates GhostRider’s overhead. The first three reasons stem from our inability
to faithfully simulate all features of the GhostRider processor: (1) We simu-
late variable-latency instructions, (2) we simulate the use of a dynamic branch
predictor, and (3) we simulate a perfect cache for non-ORAM memory ac-
cesses. All three of these discrepancies give GhostRider an unrealistically fast
hardware platform. The fourth reason arises because our simulator does not
support AVX vector instructions, so we are unable to compare GhostRider
against a machine that can execute AVX vector instructions.
The non-obfuscated execution uses a 4-issue, out-of-order core with
support for Access Map Pattern Matching prefetching scheme [42] for the L1,
L2 and L3 data caches. In all other respects, the two processor configurations
are identical. Both processors are clocked at 1 GHz. The processor configu-
ration closely matches the configuration described by Fletcher et al. [33], and
based on their measurements, we assume that the latency to all ORAM banks
is 1,488 cycles per cache line. We run GhostRider’s benchmarks on this mod-
ified Marss86 simulator and manually add the cost of each ORAM access to
the total program execution latency.
Performance Comparison. Figure 3.9 compares the overhead of GhostRider
on the simulated processor and the overhead of Raccoon. Only those bench-
mark programs that meet GhostRider’s assumptions are used in this com-
parison. The remaining seven applications cannot be transformed by the
GhostRider solution because they use pointers or because they invoke func-
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Figure 3.10: Software ORAM performance.
tions in the secret context. We see that Raccoon’s overhead (geometric mean
of 16.1× over all 15 benchmarks, geometric mean of 21.8× over GhostRider-
only benchmarks) is significantly lower than GhostRider’s overhead (geometric
mean of 195×), even when giving GhostRider’s processor substantial benefits
(perfect caching, lack of AVX-vector support in the baseline processor, and
dynamic branch prediction).
3.5.3 Software Path ORAM
This section considers choices for Raccoon’s ORAM implementation. In
particular, to run on typical general-purpose processors, we need to modify the
Path ORAM algorithm to assume just a tiny amount of trusted memory, which
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forces us to stream the position map and stash multiple times to obliviously
copy or update elements.
We thus consider three possible implementations. The first, recursive
ORAM [96], places the position map in a smaller ORAM until the position
map of the smallest ORAM fits in the CPU registers. The second is a non-
recursive solution that streams over a single large position map. The third
uses AVX intrinsic operations and streams over the entire array to access a
single element.
Figure 3.10(a) compares the cost of ORAM initialization for different
ORAM sizes in our recursive and non-recursive ORAM implementations. On
this log-log scale, we see that the non-recursive ORAM is significantly faster
than the recursive ORAM for all sizes. Figure 3.10(b) compares our non-
recursive ORAM implementation against the streaming approach. In partic-
ular, it measures the cost of accessing a single element and the cost of 64
single-element random accesses using ORAM and streaming. We see that the
streaming implementation is orders of magnitude faster than our non-recursive
ORAM.
In summary, our software implementation of Path ORAM requires non-
trivial changes to the original Path ORAM algorithm. Unfortunately, these
changes impose a prohibitively large memory bandwidth requirement, mak-
ing the modified software Path ORAM far costlier than streaming over ar-
rays. Raccoon’s obfuscation technique is compatible with the use of dedicated
ORAM memory controllers, and Raccoon’s overhead can be further reduced
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by using such special purpose hardware [65].
3.6 Discussion
Closing Other Side-Channels. The existing Raccoon implementation does
not defend against kernel-space side-channel attacks. However, many of Rac-
coon’s obfuscation principles can be applied to OS kernels as well. Memory
updates in systems such as TxOS [85] can be made oblivious using Raccoon’s
cmov operation. By contrast, non-digital side-channels appear to be funda-
mentally beyond Raccoon’s scope since physical characteristics (power, tem-
perature, EM radiation) of hardware devices make it possible to differentiate
between real values and decoy values.
Multi-threaded Programs. Raccoon’s data structures are stored in thread-
local storage (TLS), so Raccoon can access internal data structures without
using locks. Raccoon initializes these data-structures at thread entry-points
(identified by pthread create()) and frees them at thread destruction-points
(identified by pthread exit()). Raccoon prevents race conditions on the user
program’s memory by using locks where necessary. Most importantly, as long
as the user program is race-free, Raccoon maintains the correct data-flow de-
pendences in both single-threaded and multi-threaded programs, as described
in Section 3.4.1.
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Taint Analysis. Raccoon’s taint analysis is sound but not complete, so it
over-approximates the amount of code that must be obfuscated. For large pro-
grams, this over-approximation is a significant source of overhead. Raccoon’s
taint analysis is flow-insensitive, path-insensitive, and context-insensitive, and
Raccoon uses a rudimentary alias analysis technique that assumes two pointers
alias if they have the same type. We believe that more precise static analysis
techniques can be used to greatly shrink Raccoon’s taint graph, thus reducing
the obfuscation overhead.
Limitations Imposed by Hardware. Various x86 instructions (DIV, SQRT,
etc.) consume different cycles depending on their operands. Such operand-
dependent instruction execution latency introduces the biggest hurdle in en-
suring the safety of Raccoon-obfuscated programs. We also believe that the
performance overhead of obfuscated programs would be substantially smaller
than the current overhead if processors came equipped with (small) scratch-
pad memory. Based on these conjectures, we plan to explore the impact of
modified hardware designs in the near future.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have introduced the notion of digital side-channel
attacks, and we have presented a system named Raccoon to defend against such
attacks. We have evaluated Raccoon’s performance against 15 programs to
show that its overhead is significantly less than that of the best prior work and
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that it has several additional benefits: It expands the threat model, it removes
special-purpose hardware, it permits the release of the transformed code to
the adversary, and it also expands the set of supported language features. In
comparing Raccoon against GhostRider, we find that Raccoon’s overhead is
more than 8.9× lower.
Raccoon’s obfuscation technique can be enhanced in several ways. First,
while the performance overhead of Raccoon-obfuscated programs is high enough
to preclude immediate practical deployment, we believe that this overhead can
be substantially reduced by employing deterministic or special-purpose hard-
ware. Second, Raccoon’s technique of transactional execution and oblivious
memory update can be applied to the operating system (OS) kernel, thus
paving the way for protection against OS-based digital side-channel attacks.
Finally, in addition to defending against side-channel attacks, we believe that
Raccoon can be strengthened to defend against covert-channel communication.
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Chapter 4
Closing Side Channels due to Floating-Point
Instructions
In this chapter, we present our research on closing side channels arising
due to variable-latency floating point instructions. We also present an opti-
mized approach for closing control flow side channels. Portions of this work
have been published in the 2016 USENIX Security Symposium [88]1.
Numerous side channels exist, including instruction and data caches [80,
83], branch predictors [2], memory usage [44, 110], execution time [18, 95],
heat [67], power [51], and electromagnetic radiation [35], but one particularly
insidious side channel arises from the execution of variable-latency floating-
point instructions [7, 37], in which an instruction’s latency varies widely de-
pending on its operands, as shown in Table 4.1.
Both x862 and ARM3 provide variable-latency floating-point instruc-
1Full citation: Ashay Rane, Calvin Lin, and Mohit Tiwari, “Secure, Precise, and Fast
Floating-Point Operations on x86 Processors” in USENIX Security Symposium (SEC), pages
71–86, 2016. The author of this dissertation contributed to this paper by designing the
research, performing the research, evaluating the solution, and comparing the solution with
prior work.
2http://www.agner.org/optimize/instruction_tables.pdf
3http://infocenter.arm.com/help/index.jsp?topic=/com.arm.doc.ddi0344k/
ch16s07s01.html
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Zero Normal Subnormal Infinity NaN
7 11 153 7 7
Table 4.1: Latency (in cycles) of the SQRTSS instruction for various operands.
tions. This variable latency stems from the desire to have graceful floating-
point arithmetic behavior, which, as we explain in Section 4.2, requires the
use of so-called subnormal values [31], which are processed using special algo-
rithms. Since subnormal values are rare, hardware vendors typically support
such values in microcode, so as not to slow down the common case. The re-
sulting difference in instruction latency creates a timing side channel, which
has been used to infer cross-origin data in browsers and to break differential
privacy guarantees of a remote database [7].
However, variable latency floating-point instructions represent only a
part of the problem, since higher level floating-point operations, such as sine
and cosine, are typically implemented in software. Thus, the implementation
of these floating-point operations can leak secret information through other
side channels as well. Depending on the secret values, programs can throw
exceptions, thereby leaking the presence of abnormal inputs through termina-
tion. Programs can also contain conditional branches, which can leak secrets
through the instruction pointer, branch predictor, or memory access count.
Finally, programs that index into lookup tables can leak secrets through the
memory address trace.
To prevent information leaks in both floating-point instructions and
floating-point software, a strong solution should ensure at least four key prop-
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erties, which correspond to the side channels that we discussed above: (1) fixed-
time operations that are independent of secret values, (2) disabled exceptions,
(3) sequential control flow, and (4) uniform data accesses that are independent
of the value of secret variables. Previous solutions [7, 23] are inadequate be-
cause they do not ensure all four properties, are slow, are orders of magnitude
less precise, or are difficult to implement.
This work presents a novel solution that closes side channels arising
from both hardware and software implementations of floating point operations,
providing all four properties mentioned above. Our compiler-based solution
has two components.
The first component creates building blocks of elementary floating-point
operations for instructions that are natively supported by the hardware (addi-
tion, subtraction, multiplication, division, square root, and type conversion).
Our solution leverages unused SIMD lanes so that fast operations on nor-
mal operands are accompanied by slower dummy computations on subnormal
operands, yielding a consistent yet low instruction latency for all types of
operands.
The second component is a software library of higher-level floating-
point operations like sine and cosine. The key to creating this second com-
ponent is a new code transformation that produces fixed-latency functions
through normalized control flows and data access patterns. Code generated
by our compiler closes digital side-channels, which have been defined to be
those side channels that carry information over discrete bits [87]. Whereas
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previous work in closing digital side channels employs a runtime system [87],
our solution shifts much of the work to compile time, yielding a significantly
smaller runtime overhead.
This work makes the following contributions:
1. We present a novel compiler-based system, called Escort, for closing dig-
ital side channels that arise from the processing of floating-point instruc-
tions.
2. Secure: We demonstrate that our solution is secure not just against
timing but also against digital side channels. We demonstrate Escort’s
capabilities by defeating a machine-learning side-channel attack, by de-
fending against a timing attack on the Firefox web browser, by conduct-
ing extensive performance measurements on an x86 processor, and by
verifying our solution’s code using typing rules.
3. Precise: We show that Escort provides precision that is identical to
that of the standard C math library. By contrast, the previous solution’s
precision is off by several million floating-point values.
4. Fast: We show that our solution is fast. On a set of micro-benchmarks
that exercise elementary floating-point operations, Escort is 16× faster
than the previous solution [7].
5. As an ancillary contribution, we introduce a methodology for evaluating
the precision and security of floating-point operations, which is fraught
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with subtleties.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 4.1 describes
Escort’s guarantees. We provide background in Section 4.2 before presenting
our solution in Section 4.3. We evaluate our solution in Sections 4.4–4.6.
Finally, we conclude in Section 4.7.
4.1 Escort’s Guarantees
Escort rejects programs that contain unsupported features—I/O op-
erations and recursive function calls. Unlike prior work [61, 87], Escort does
transform loops that leak information through trip counts. Escort is unable
to handle programs containing irreducible control flow graphs (CFGs), but
standard compiler transformations [76] can transform irreducible CFGs into
reducible CFGs. Escort assumes that the input program does not use vector
instructions, does not exhibit undefined behavior, does not terminate abnor-
mally through exceptions, and is free of race conditions. Given a program that
abides by these limitations, Escort guarantees that the transformed code pro-
duces identical results as the original program, does not leak secrets through
timing or digital side channels, and that the transformed code does not termi-
nate abnormally.
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Figure 4.1: Impact of allowing subnormal numbers. Without subnormal val-
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number than between the first two smallest positive numbers. With subnor-
mal numbers, the values are more equally spaced. (The figure is not drawn to
scale.)
4.2 Background
The variable latency of floating-point instructions creates security vul-
nerabilities. In this section, we explain subnormal numbers, which are the
cause of the variable latency, and we explain the difficulty of fixing the result-
ing vulnerability. We also explain how the Unit of Least Precision (ULP) can
be used to quantify the precision of our and competing solutions.
4.2.1 Subnormal Numbers
Subnormal numbers have tiny exponents, which result in floating-point
values that are extremely close to zero: 10−45 < |x| < 10−38 for single-precision
numbers and 10−324 < |x| < 10−308 for double-precision numbers. Subnormal
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values extend the range of floating-point numbers that can be represented,
but more importantly, they enable gradual underflow—the property that as
floating-point numbers approach zero along the number scale, the difference
between successive floating-point numbers does not increase4. Figures 4.1a
and 4.1b show the differences between zero and the two smallest positive
floating-point numbers. With subnormal numbers, the gap between any two
consecutive floating-point values is never larger than the values themselves,
thus exhibiting Gradual Underflow. Subnormal numbers are indispensable
because gradual underflow is required for reliable equation solving and con-
vergence acceleration [31, 47].
To avoid the added hardware complexity of supporting subnormal num-
bers, which occur infrequently, vendors typically process subnormal values in
microcode, which is orders of magnitude slower than hardwired logic.
The resulting difference in latencies creates a security vulnerability.
An adversary that can measure the latency of a floating-point instruction can
make reasonable estimates about the operand type, potentially inferring secret
values using the timing channel. While subnormal values occur infrequently
in typical program execution, an adversary can deliberately induce subnormal
values in the application’s inputs to enable subnormal operand timing attacks.
4https://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~wkahan/ARITH_17U.pdf
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4.2.2 Floating-Point Error Measurement
Unlike real (infinite precision) numbers, floating-point numbers use a
limited number of bits to store values, thus making them prone to rounding
errors. Rounding errors in floating-point numbers are typically measured in
terms of the Unit of Least Precision (ULP) [77]. The ULP distance between
two floating-point numbers is the number of distinct representable floating-
point numbers between them, which is simply the result of subtracting their
integer representations. If the result of the subtraction is zero, the floating-
point numbers must be exactly the same.
4.3 Our Solution: Escort
Escort offers secure counterparts of ordinary non-secure floating-point
operations, including both elementary operations and higher-level math op-
erations. The elementary operations include the six basic floating-point op-
erations that are natively supported by the ISA—type conversion, addition,
subtraction, multiplication, division, and square root—and a conditional data
copy operation. The 112 higher-level math operations are those that are imple-
mented using a combination of native instructions. Examples of higher-level
functions include sine, cosine, tangent, power, logarithm, exponentiation, ab-
solute value, floor, and ceiling.
The next subsections describe Escort’s design in three parts. First, we
describe the design of Escort’s secure elementary operations. These opera-
tions collectively form the foundation of Escort’s security guarantees. Second,
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Figure 4.2: The key idea behind Escort’s secure elementary operations. The
operation is forced to exhibit a fixed latency by executing a fixed-latency long-
running operation in a spare SIMD lane.
we describe Escort’s compiler, which accepts non-secure code for higher-level
operations and converts it into secure code. This compiler combines a code
transformation technique with Escort’s secure elementary operations. Third,
we present an example that shows the synergy among Escort’s components.
4.3.1 Elementary Operations
The key insight behind Escort’s secure elementary operations is that the
latencies of SIMD instructions are determined by the slowest operation among
the SIMD lanes (see Figure 4.2), so the Escort compiler ensures that each ele-
mentary instruction runs along side a dummy instruction whose operand will
produce the longest possible latency. Our analysis of 94 x86 SSE and SSE2 in-
structions (which includes single- and double-precision arithmetic, comparison,
logical, and conversion instructions) reveals: (1) that only the multiplication,
division, square root, and single-precision to double-precision conversion (up-
cast) instructions exhibit latencies that depend on their operands and (2) that
subnormal operands induce the longest latency.
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double escort_mul_dp(double x, double y) {
const double k_normal_dp = 1.4;
const double k_subnormal_dp = 2.225e-322;
double result;
__asm__ volatile(
"movdqa %1, %%xmm14;"
"movdqa %2, %%xmm15;"
"pslldq $8, %1;"
"pslldq $8, %2;"
"por %3, %1;"
"por %4, %2;"
"movdqa %2, %0;"
"mulpd %1, %0;"
"psrldq $8, %0;"
"movdqa %%xmm14, %1;"
"movdqa %%xmm15, %2;"
: "=x" (result), "+x" (x), "+x" (y)
: "x" (k_subnormal_dp), "x" (k_normal_dp)
: "xmm15", "xmm14");
return result;
}
Figure 4.3: Escort’s implementation of double-precision multiplication, using
the AT&T syntax.
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01: copy(uint8_t pred, uint32_t t_val, uint32_t f_val) {
02: uint32_t result;
03: __asm__ volatile (
04: "mov %2, %0;"
05: "test %1, %1;"
06: "cmovz %3, %0;"
07: "test %2, %2;"
08: : "=r" (result)
09: : "r" (pred), "r" (t_val), "r" (f_val)
10: : "cc"
11: );
12: return result;
13: }
Figure 4.4: Code for conditional data copy operation that does not leak infor-
mation over digital side channels. This function returns t val if pred is true;
otherwise it returns f val. The assembly code uses AT&T syntax.
In particular, Escort’s fixed-time floating-point operations utilize SIMD
lanes in x86 SSE and SSE2 instructions. Our solution (1) loads genuine and
dummy (subnormal) inputs in spare SIMD lanes of the same input register,
(2) invokes the desired SIMD instruction, and (3) retains only the result of
the operation on the genuine inputs. Our tests confirm that the resulting
SIMD instruction exhibits the worst-case latency, with negligible variation in
running time (standard deviation is at most 1.5% of the mean). Figure 4.3
shows Escort’s implementation of one such operation.
Escort includes Raccoon’s conditional data copy operation (see Fig-
ure 4.4) which does not leak information through digital side channels. This
operation copies the contents of one register to another register if the given
condition is true. However, regardless of the condition, this operation con-
sumes a fixed amount of time, executes the same set of instructions, and does
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of instructions that are left uninstrumented (without
sacrificing security) after consulting the SMT solver.
not access application memory.
4.3.2 Compiling Higher-Level Operations
Escort’s compiler converts existing non-secure code into secure code
that prevents information leakage through digital side channels. First, our
compiler replaces all elementary floating-point operations with their secure
counterparts. Next, our compiler produces straight-line code that preserves
control dependences among basic blocks while preventing instruction side ef-
fects from leaking secrets. Our compiler then transforms array access state-
ments so that they do not leak information through memory address traces.
Finally, our compiler transforms loops whose trip count reveals secrets over
digital side channels. We now describe each step in turn.
4.3.2.1 Step 1: Using Secure Elementary Operations
The Escort compiler replaces x86 floating-point type-conversion, mul-
tiplication, division, and square root assembly instructions with their Escort
74
counterparts. However, Escort’s secure elementary operations can be up to
two orders of magnitude slower than their non-secure counterparts. Hence,
our compiler minimizes their usage by using taint tracking and by employ-
ing the quantifier-free bit-vector logic in the Z3 SMT solver [30], which is
equipped with floating-point number theory. If the solver can prove that the
operands can never be subnormal values, then Escort refrains from replacing
that instruction.
In effect, the Escort compiler constructs path-sensitive Z3 expressions
for each arithmetic statement in the LLVM IR. For every Φ-node that pro-
duces an operand for an arithmetic expression, Escort creates one copy of
the expression for each input to the Φ-node. If the solver reports that no
operand can have a subnormal value, then Escort skips instrumentation of
that floating-point operation.
We set a timeout of 40 seconds for each invocation of the SMT solver. If
the solver can prove that the instruction never uses subnormal operands, then
Escort skips replacing that floating-point instruction with its secure counter-
part. Figure 4.5 shows the percentage of floating-point instructions in com-
monly used math functions that are left untransformed by Escort.
This optimization is conservative because it assumes that all floating-
point instructions in the program have subnormal operands unless proven oth-
erwise. The correctness of the optimization is independent of the code’s use
of pointers, library calls, system calls, or dynamic values. The static analysis
used in this optimization is flow-sensitive, path-sensitive, and intra-procedural.
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1: for each basic block bb in function do
2: if entry block(bb) then
3: pred[bb]← true
4: else
5: pred[bb]← false
6: end if
7: end for
8:
9: for each basic block bb in function do
10: br ← branch(bb)
11: if unconditional branch(br) then
12: {s} ← successors(bb)
13: pred[s]← pred[s] ∨ pred[bb]
14: pred[s]← simplify(pred[s])
15: else . Conditional Branch.
16: {s1, s2} ← successors(bb)
17: if loop condition branch(br) then
18: . Skip branches that represent loops.
19: pred[s1]← pred[s1] ∨ pred[bb]
20: pred[s2]← pred[s2] ∨ pred[bb]
21: else
22: p← condition(br)
23: pred[s1]← pred[s1] ∨ (pred[bb] ∧ p)
24: pred[s2]← pred[s2] ∨ (pred[bb] ∧ ¬p)
25: end if
26: pred[s1]← simplify(pred[s1])
27: pred[s2]← simplify(pred[s2])
28: end if
29: end for
Figure 4.6: Algorithm for predicating basic blocks.
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4.3.2.2 Step 2: Predicating Basic Blocks
Basic block predicates represent the conditions that dictate whether an
instruction should execute. These predicates are derived by analyzing condi-
tional branch instructions. For each conditional branch instruction that evalu-
ates a predicate p, the Escort compiler associates the predicate p with all basic
blocks that execute if the predicate is true, and it associates the predicate ¬p
with all basic blocks that execute if the predicate is false. For unconditional
branches, the compiler copies the predicate of the previous block into the next
block. Finally, if the Escort compiler comes across a block that already has a
predicate, then the compiler sets the block’s new predicate to the logical OR
of the input predicates. At each step, the Escort compiler uses Z3 as a SAT
solver to simplify predicates by eliminating unnecessary variables in predicate
formulas. Figure 4.6 shows the algorithm for basic block predication.
4.3.2.3 Step 3: Linearizing Basic Blocks
The Escort compiler converts the given code into straight-line code so
that every invocation of the code executes the same instructions. To preserve
control dependences, the basic blocks are topologically sorted, and then the
code is assembled into a single basic block with branch instructions removed.
4.3.2.4 Step 4: Controlling Side Effects
We now explain how Escort prevents side effects from leaking secrets.
Here, side effects are modifications to the program state or any observable in-
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1: p← &a
2: secret← input() . Assume input() returns true.
3: if secret = true then
4: ...
5: else
6: ...
7: p← &b . Instruction does not update pointer p, since basic block’s
execution-time predicate is false.
8: ∗p← 10 . Accesses a instead of b!
9: end if
Figure 4.7: The use of pointers can leak information. If store instructions
are not allowed to access memory when the basic block’s predicate is false,
then pointer p will dereference the address for a instead of b, thus revealing
that secret is true.
teraction, including memory accesses, exceptions, function calls, or I/O. Escort
controls all side effects except for I/O statements.
Memory Access Side Effects. To ensure proper memory access side ef-
fects, the Escort compiler replaces store instructions with conditional data-
copy operations that are guarded by the basic block’s predicate, so memory is
only updated by instructions whose predicate is true.
Unfortunately, this na¨ıve approach can leak secret information when the
program uses pointers. Figure 4.7 illustrates the problem: If store instructions
are not allowed to update a pointer variable when the basic block predicate is
false, then the address trace from subsequent load instructions on the pointer
variable will expose the fact that the pointer variable was not updated.
The Escort compiler prevents such information leaks by statically re-
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placing pointer dereferences with loads or stores to each element of the points-
to set5. Thus Escort replaces the statement in line 8 (Figure 4.7) with a store
operation on b. When the points-to set is larger than a singleton set, Escort
uses the conditional data copy operation on all potential pointees i.e. the el-
ements of the points-to set. The predicate of the conditional copy operation
checks whether the pointer points to the candidate pointee. If the predicate
is false, the pointee’s existing value is overwritten, whereas if the predicate is
true, the new value is written to the pointee.
Function Call Side Effects. Adversaries can observe the invocation of
functions (or lack thereof) using side channels like the Instruction Pointer.
Thus, a solution incapable of handling function calls will leak information
to the adversary. While inlining functions is a potential solution, inlining is
impractical for large applications.
Escort handles side effects from function calls by propagating the pred-
icate from the calling function to the callee. Thus, each user-defined function
is given an additional argument that represents the predicate of the call site’s
basic block. The callee ensures correct handling of side effects by ANDing its
own predicates with the caller’s predicate.
5Escort uses a flow-sensitive, context-insensitive pointer analysis: https://github.com/
grievejia/tpa. Replacing a pointer dereference with a store operation on all elements of
the points-to set is feasible for Escort because points-to set sizes in the Musl C library are
very small.
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Side Effects from Exceptions. Program termination caused by exceptions
will leak the presence or absence of abnormal operands. To prevent such
information leakage, Escort requires that exceptions not occur during program
execution6.
Escort manages floating-point and integer exceptions differently. Es-
cort requires that the programmer disable floating-point exceptions (e.g. us-
ing feclearexcept()). For integer exceptions, Escort borrows ideas from
Raccoon by replacing abnormal operands with benign operands (e.g. Escort
prevents integer division-by-zero by replacing a zero divisor with a non-zero
divisor).
4.3.2.5 Step 5: Transforming Array Accesses
Array index values reveal secrets as well. For instance, if the adversary
observes that accesses to array[0] and array[secret index] result in ac-
cesses to locations 10 and 50, then the adversary knows that secret index =
40. To eliminate such information leaks, the Escort compiler transforms each
array access into a linear sweep over the entire array, which hides from the
adversary the address of the program’s actual array index.
Of course, the transformed code is expensive, but this approach is fea-
sible because (1) math library functions typically use only a few small lookup
tables, thus requiring relatively few memory accesses and (2) the processor’s
6Escort assumes that the input program does not throw exceptions, so masking excep-
tions does not change the semantics of the program.
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caches and prefetchers dramatically reduce the cost of sweeping over the ar-
rays.
4.3.2.6 Step 6: Transforming Loops
Some loops introduce timing channels because their trip counts depend
on secret values. The Escort compiler transforms such loops using predictive
mitigation [117]. The loop body executes as many times as the smallest power
of 2 that is greater than or equal to the loop trip count. For instance, if the
actual loop trip count is 10, then the loop body is executed 16 times. The
basic block predicate ensures that dummy iterations do not cause side effects.
With this transformed code, an adversary that observes a loop trip count of l
can infer that the actual loop trip count l′ is between l and 0.5× l. However,
the exact value of l′ is not revealed to the adversary.
Unfortunately, this naive approach can still leak information. For in-
stance, if two distinct inputs cause the loop to iterate 10 and 1000 times re-
spectively, the transformed codes will iterate 16 and 1024 times respectively—a
large difference that may create timing variations. To mitigate this problem,
Escort allows the programmer to manually specify the minimum and maximum
loop trip counts using programmer annotations. These annotations override
the default settings used by the Escort compiler.
4.3.3 Example Transformation: exp10f
We now explain how Escort transforms an example non-secure function
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float e10(float x) {
float n, y = mf(x, &n);
if (int(n) >> 23 & 0xff < 0x82) {
float p = p10[(int) n + 7];
if (y == 0.0f) {
return p;
}
return exp2f(3.322f * y) * p;
}
return exp2(3.322 * x);
}
(a) Original code for exp10f().
01: float e10(float x) {
02: float n, y = mf(x, &n);
03: if (int(n) >> 23 & 0xff < 0x82) {
04: float p = p10[(int) n + 7];
05: if (y == 0.0f)
06: result = p;
07: else
08: result =
exp2f(3.322f * y) * p;
09: } else
10: result = exp2(3.322 * x);
11: return result;
12: }
(b) Result after applying LLVM’s
mergereturn pass. This code becomes
the input for the Escort compiler.
12: float e10(float x) {
13: return e10_cloned(x, true);
14: }
15:
16: float e10_cloned(float x, uint pred) {
17: float n, y = mf_cloned(x, &n, pred);
18: float p = write(int(n) >> 23 & 0xff
< 0x82, stream_load(p10, (int) n + 7]));
19: bool p2 = y == 0.0f;
20: write(pred & p1 & p2, p, &result);
21: write(pred & p1 & !p2,
escort_mul(
escort_mul(
exp2f_cloned(3.322f,
pred & p1 & !p2),
y),
p),
&result);
22: write(!p1,
escort_mul(
exp2_cloned(3.322, pred & !p1),
escort_upcast(x))),
result);
23: return result;
24: }
(c) Result of the Escort compiler’s trans-
formation.
Figure 4.8: Escort’s transformation of exp10f().
82
Line # Predicate
2, 3, 11 TRUE
4, 5 (n >> 23 & 0xff) < 0x82
6 (n >> 23 & 0xff) < 0x82 ∧ y = 0
8 (n >> 23 & 0xff) < 0x82 ∧ y 6= 0
10 ¬((n >> 23 & 0xff) < 0x82)
Table 4.2: Predicates per line for function in Figure 4.8b.
(Figure 4.8a) into a secure function (Figure 4.8c). To simplify subsequent anal-
yses and transformations, the Escort compiler applies LLVM’s mergereturn
transformation pass, which unifies all exit nodes in the input function (see
Figure 4.8b).
First, the Escort compiler replaces elementary floating-point operations
in lines 8 and 10 with their secure counterpart function shown in lines 21 and
22 of the transformed code. Second, using the algorithm shown in Figure 4.6,
the Escort compiler associates predicates with each basic block, which we list
in Table 4.2. Third, the Escort compiler linearizes basic blocks by applying
a topological sort on the control flow graph (see Figure 4.9) and fuses the
basic blocks together. Finally, the Escort compiler replaces the array access
statement in line 4 with a function that sweeps over the entire array. The
resulting code, shown in Figure 4.8c, eliminates control flows and data flows
that depend on secret values. In addition to closing digital side channels, the
code also uses secure floating-point operations.
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A: y = mf(x, &n)
(n >> 23 
& 0xff) 
< 0x82?
B: p = p10[n + 7]
y = 0?C: result = exp2
(3.332 * x)
D: result = p
E: result = exp2f
(3.332f * y) * p
F: return result
Yes
Yes
No
No
Figure 4.9: Control flow graph with labeled statements for the code in Fig-
ure 4.8b. A, B, D, E, C, F is one possible sequence of basic blocks when linearized
by the Escort compiler.
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4.4 Security Evaluation
This section demonstrates that Escort’s floating-point operations run
in fixed time and do not leak information through digital side channels. Since
precise timing measurement on x86 processors is tricky due to complex proces-
sor and OS design, we take special measures to ensure that our measurements
are accurate. In addition to Escort’s timing and digital side channel defense,
we also demonstrate Escort’s defense against a floating-point timing channel
attack on the Firefox web browser.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
We run all experiments on a 4-core Intel Core i7-2600 (Sandy Bridge)
processor. The processor is clocked at 3.4 GHz. Each core on this processor has
a 32 KB private L1 instruction cache, a 32 KB private L1 data cache, and a 256
KB private L2 cache. A single 8 MB L3 cache is shared among all four cores.
The host operating system is Ubuntu 14.04 running kernel version 3.13. We
implement compiler transformations using the LLVM compiler framework [55]
version 3.8.
We measure instruction latencies using the RDTSC instruction that re-
turns the number of elapsed cycles since resetting the processor. Since the
latency of executing the RDTSC instruction is usually higher than the latency
of executing operations, our setup measures the latency of executing 1024 con-
secutive operations and divides the measured latency by 1024. Our setup uses
the CPUID instruction and volatile variables for preventing the processor and
85
the compiler from reordering critical instructions. Finally, our setup measures
overhead by executing an empty loop body—a loop body that contains no in-
structions other than those in the test harness. By placing an empty volatile
asm block in the empty loop body, our setup prevents the compiler from
deleting the empty loop body.
4.4.1.1 Outlier Elimination
Many factors outside of the experiment’s control, like interrupts, schedul-
ing policies, etc., may result in outliers in performance measurements. We now
explain our procedure for eliminating outliers, before demonstrating that the
elimination of these outliers does not bias the conclusions.
We use Tukey’s method [106] for identifying outliers, but we adapt it
to conservatively classify fewer values as outliers (thus including more values
as valid data points). The original Tukey’s method first finds the minimum
(Mn), median (Md), and maximum (Mx) of a set of values. The first quartile,
Q1, is the median of values between Mn and Md. The third quartile, Q3, is the
median of values between Mx and Md. The difference between the first and
the third quartiles (Q3−Q1) is called the Inter-Quartile Range, RIQ. Tukey’s
method states that any value v, such that v > Q3+3×RIQ or v < Q1−3×RIQ
is a probable outlier. In our evaluation, we weaken our outlier elimination
process (i.e. we count fewer values as outliers), by (1) setting the RIQ to be at
least equal to 1.0, and (2) classifying v as an outlier when v > Q3 +20×RIQ or
v < Q1 − 20×RIQ. Results presented in the following sections use the relaxed
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Mean Median Std. Dev.
Different
Operands
847,323
(0.81%)
1,066,270
(1.02%)
381,467
Same
Operands
929,703
(0.89%)
1,139,961
(1.09%)
364,192
Table 4.3: Number of discarded outliers from 100 million double-precision
square-root operations. The results indicate that our outlier elimination pro-
cess is statistically independent of the input operand values.
Tukey method described above.
To demonstrate that our outlier elimination process does not bias con-
clusions, we compare the distribution of outliers between (a) 100 million op-
erations using randomly-generated operands, and (b) 100 million operations
using one fixed operand. The two experiments do not differ in any way other
than the difference in their input operands. Table 4.3 shows the mean, median,
and standard deviation of outliers for the double-precision square-root opera-
tion. Results for other floating-point operations are similar and are elided for
space reasons. Since the difference in mean values as well as the difference in
median values is within a quarter of the standard deviation from the mean,
we conclude that the discarded outlier count is statistically independent of the
input operand values.
4.4.2 Timing Assurance of Elementary Operations
Since exhaustively testing all possible inputs for each operation is in-
feasible, we instead take the following three-step approach for demonstrating
the timing channel defense for Escort’s elementary operations: (1) We charac-
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Figure 4.10: Comparison of running times of elementary operations. sp identi-
fies Escort’s single-precision operations, dp identifies Escort’s double-precision
operations, and fix identifies FTFP’s fixed-point operations. Numbers at the
top of the bars show the total cycle count. We see that Escort’s execution
times are dominated by the cost of subnormal operations, and we see that
FTFP’s overheads are significantly greater than Escort’s.
terize the performance of Escort’s elementary operations using a specific, fixed
floating-point value (e.g. 1.0), (2) using one value from each of the six differ-
ent types of values (zero, normal, subnormal, +∞, -∞, and not-a-number),
we show that our solution exhibits negligible variance in running time, and
(3) to demonstrate that each of the six values in the previous experiment is
representative of the class to which it belongs, we generate 10 million normal,
subnormal, and not-a-number (NaN) values, and show that the variance in
running time among each set of 10 million values is negligible. Our key find-
ings are that Escort’s operations run in fixed time, are fast, and that their
performance is closely tied to the performance of the hardware’s subnormal
operations.
Figure 4.10 compares the running times of elementary operations of Es-
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Function Escort
Native
(SSE)
add-sp 0 0
add-dp 0 0
sub-sp 0 0
sub-dp 0 0
mul-sp 0 49.2 (175%)
mul-dp 0 49.2 (175%)
div-sp 0.66 (0.4%) 65.67 (163%)
div-dp 1.66 (0.8%) 69.08 (164%)
sqrt-sp 1.49 (0.8%) 62.7 (170%)
sqrt-dp 2.98 (1.5%) 66.87 (169%)
upcast 0 40.99 (178%)
Table 4.4: Comparison of standard deviation of running times of elementary
operations across six types of values (zero, normal, subnormal, +∞, −∞,
and not-a-number). Numbers in parenthesis show the standard deviation as
a percentage of the mean. The -sp suffix identifies single-precision operations
while the -dp suffix identifies double-precision operations. Compared to SSE
operations, Escort exhibits negligible variation in running times.
cort and of previous solutions (FTFP). First, we observe that the running times
of Escort’s single- and double-precision operations are an order-of-magnitude
lower than those of FTFP’s fixed-precision operations. Second, Escort’s run-
ning time is almost entirely dominated by the processor’s operation on sub-
normal numbers. Third, conversion between fixed-point and floating-point
takes a non-trivial amount of time, further increasing the overhead of FTFP’s
operations. Overall, Escort elementary operations are about 16× faster than
FTFP’s.
Table 4.4 shows the variation in running time of elementary operations
across six different types of inputs (zero, normal value, subnormal value, +∞,
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Fn. NaN Normal Subnormal
add-sp 0.21 (3.1%) 0.21 (2.9%) 0.19 (2.7%)
add-dp 0.21 (3.0%) 0.20 (2.9%) 0.21 (3.0%)
sub-sp 0.18 (2.6%) 0.19 (2.7%) 0.20 (2.9%)
sub-dp 0.19 (2.7%) 0.19 (2.7%) 0.19 (2.7%)
mul-sp 0.98 (0.7%) 0.94 (0.7%) 1.05 (0.7%)
mul-dp 0.90 (0.6%) 1.04 (0.7%) 1.02 (0.7%)
div-sp 1.22 (0.6%) 1.27 (0.7%) 1.23 (0.6%)
div-dp 1.39 (0.7%) 1.37 (0.6%) 1.17 (0.6%)
sqrt-sp 1.15 (0.6%) 1.13 (0.6%) 1.14 (0.6%)
sqrt-dp 1.29 (0.7%) 1.41 (0.7%) 1.33 (0.7%)
upcast 1.03 (0.9%) 0.89 (0.8%) 0.95 (0.8%)
Table 4.5: Standard deviation of 10 million measurements for each type of
value (normal, subnormal, and not-a-number). All standard deviation values
are within 3.1% of the mean. Furthermore, the mean of these 10,000,000
measurements is always within 2.7% of the representative measurement.
−∞, and not-a-number value) and compares it with the variation of SSE (na-
tive) operations. While SSE operations exhibit high variation (the maximum
observed standard deviation is 176% of the mean), Escort’s operations show
negligible variation across different input types.
Finally, we measure Escort’s running time for 10 million random nor-
mal, subnormal, and not-a-number values. We observe that the standard de-
viation of these measurements, shown in Table 4.5, is extremely low (at most
3.1% of the mean). We thus conclude that our chosen values for each of the
six classes faithfully represent their class.
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Figure 4.11: Comparison of running times of commonly used higher-level func-
tions. Error bars (visible for only a few functions) show the maximum variation
in running time for different kinds of input values.
4.4.3 Timing Assurance of Higher-Level Operations
Using different types of floating-point values (zero, normal, subnormal,
+∞, −∞, and not-a-number), Figure 4.11 compares the performance of most
of the commonly used single- and double-precision higher-level operations7.
Overall Escort’s higher-level operations are about 2× slower than their cor-
responding FTFP operation, which is the price for closing side channels that
FTFP does not close.
Figure 4.12 shows the breakdown of the performance of commonly used
higher-level functions. We observe that the performance of most higher-level
functions is dominated by the latency of operations on subnormal operands,
which is closely tied to the performance of the underlying hardware. A handful
of routines (exp10(), exp10f(), exp2(), and exp2f()) use lookup tables that
7We exclude the exp2() (6,617 cycles), exp10() (14,910 cycles), exp2f() (1,693 cycles),
and exp10f() (9,134 cycles) from Figure 4.11 because FTFP does not implement these
operations.
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Figure 4.12: Performance breakdown of Escort’s commonly used higher-level
functions. The baseline (non-secure) execution and exception handling to-
gether cost less than 250 cycles for each function, making them too small to
be clearly visible in the above plot.
(a) Original im-
age.
(b) Reconstructed
image using tim-
ing attack.
(c) Reconstructed images in 3 inde-
pendent, consecutive experiments af-
ter patching Firefox with Escort.
Figure 4.13: Results of attack and defense on a vulnerable Firefox browser
using timing-channel information leaks arising from the use of subnormal
floating-point numbers.
are susceptible to address-trace-based side-channel information leaks, so the
code transformed by Escort sweeps over these lookup tables for each access
to the table. Finally, we see that the cost of control flow obfuscation (i.e. the
cost of executing all instructions in the program) contributes the least to the
total overhead.
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4.4.4 Side-Channel Defense in Firefox
We now evaluate Escort’s defense against the timing channel attack by
Andrysco et al. [7] on the Firefox web browser. The attack reconstructs a
two-color image inside a victim web page using only the timing side channel
in floating-point operations. The attack convolves the given secret image with
a matrix of subnormal values. The convolution step for each pixel is timed
using high resolution Javascript timers. By comparing the measured time
to a threshold, each pixel is classified as either black or white, effectively
reconstructing the secret image.
We integrate Escort into Firefox’s convolution code8 and re-run the
timing attack. The results (see Figure 4.13c) show that Escort successfully
disables the timing attack.
4.4.5 Control- and Data-Flow Assurance
We now show that Escort’s operations do not leak information through
control flow or data flow. We first use inference rules over the LLVM IR to
demonstrate non-interference between secret inputs and digital side channels.
We run a machine-learning attack on Escort and demonstrate that Escort
successfully disables the attack.
8Specifically, we replace three single-precision multiplication operations with invocations
to the equivalent Escort function. All source code changes are limited to the code in the
ConvolvePixel() function in SVGFEConvolveMatrixElement.cpp.
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T-PUBLIC-LOAD
Γ(ptr) =
L
P = ptset(ptr)
m =
max
addr∈P
Γ(addr)
Γ′ =
Γ[val 7→ m]
Γ ` val := public-load ptr : Γ′
T-PUBLIC-STORE
Γ(ptr) =
L
∀ addr ∈ ptset(p)
m = max(Γ(val),Γ(addr))
Γ′ =
Γ[addr 7→ m]
Γ ` public-store ptr, val : Γ′
T-SECRET-LOAD
Γ′ =
Γ[val 7→ H]
Γ ` val := secret-load ptr : Γ′
T-SECRET-STORE
∀ addr ∈ ptset(p)
Γ′ =
Γ[addr 7→ H]
Γ ` secret-store ptr, val : Γ′
T-BRANCH
Γ(cond) = L
Γ ` br cond,block1,block2 : Γ
T-OTHER
Γ′ = Γ[x 7→ Γ(y)]
Γ ` x:=y : Γ′
T-COMPOSITION
Γ ` S1 : Γ′, Γ′ ` S2 : Γ′′
Γ ` S1;S2 : Γ′′
T-SANITIZER
Γ′ = Γ[x 7→ L]
Γ ` S(x) : Γ′
Table 4.6: Inference rules for verifying the security of Escort’s higher-level
operations.
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4.4.5.1 Non-Interference Using Inference Rules
Since Escort’s elementary operations are small and simple—they are
implemented using fewer than 15 lines of assembly code, they do not access
memory, and they do not contain branch instructions—they are easily verified
for non-interference between secret inputs and digital side channels. Using an
LLVM pass that applies the inference rules from Table 4.6, tracking labels that
can be either L (for low-context i.e. public information) or H (for high-context
i.e. private information), we verify that Escort’s higher-level operations close
digital side channels. This compiler pass initializes all function arguments with
the label H, since arguments represent secret inputs.
Inference rules for various instructions dictate updates to the labels.
The environment Γ tracks the label of each pointer and each address. The
Escort compiler tags load and store instructions as secret if the pointer is
tainted, or public otherwise. Unlike a public load or store instruction, a
secret load or store instruction is allowed to use a tainted pointer since
Escort generates corresponding loads and stores to all statically-determined
candidate values in the points-to set. The sanitization rule resets the value’s
label to L and is required to suppress false alarms from Escort’s loop condition
transformation. Escort’s transformed code includes instructions with special
LLVM metadata that trigger the sanitization rule.
During verification, the compiler pass iterates over each instruction and
checks whether a rule is applicable using the rule’s antecedents (the statement
above the horizontal line); if so, it updates its local state as per the rule’s
95
consequent (the statement below the horizontal line). If no applicable rule is
found, then the compiler pass throws an error. The compiler pass processes
the code for Escort’s 112 higher-level operations without throwing errors.
4.4.5.2 Defense Against Machine-Learning Attack
We use the TensorFlow [1] library to design a machine-learning clas-
sifier, which we use to launch a side-channel attack on the execution of the
expf() function, where the input to the expf() function is assumed to be
secret. Using three distinct inputs, we run this attack on the implementa-
tions in the (non-secure) Musl C library and in the (secure) Escort library.
We first use the Pin dynamic binary instrumentation tool [64] to gather the
full instruction address traces of both expf() implementations9. We train
the TensorFlow machine-learning classifier by feeding the instruction address
traces to the classifier, associating each trace with the secret input to expf().
We use cross entropy as the cost function for TensorFlow’s training phase. In
the subsequent testing phase, we randomly select one of the collected address
traces and ask the classifier to predict the secret input value.
We find that for the Musl implementation, the classifier is accurately
able to predict the correct secret value from the address trace. On the other
hand, for the Escort implementation, the classifier’s accuracy drops to 33%,
which is no better than randomly guessing one of the three secret input values.
9Using the md5sum program, we observe that Escort’s address traces for all three inputs
are identical.
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Function Min. Median Max.
add 16 1,743,272 210,125,824
sub 1,312 6,026,976 84,089,503,744
mul 317 8,587,410 112,134,679,849
div 829 5,834,095 30,899,033,427
sqrt 562 2,815,331 21,257,836,468
floor 0 0 0
ceil 0 0 0
log 1,698 5,908,547 2,705,277,8104
log2 262 5,812,840 13,890,632,367
log10 981 10,105,199 40,631,590,323
exp 132 1,409,624 6,066,894
sin 1,316 4,173,786 40,138,955,131
cos 2,166 2,241,360 10,127,702
tan 717 5,576,540 40,126,401,802
pow 522 3,425,870 26,876,068,127
fabs 352 3,129,984 40,134,770,688
Table 4.7: Floating-point difference for 10,000 operations on random inputs in
terms of Unit of Least Precision (ULP) in FTFP versus Musl C library.
Since we observe zero ULP distance between Escort’s results and Musl’s re-
sults, this table omits Escort’s results.
4.5 Precision Evaluation
We examine the precision of Escort and FTFP by comparing Escort’s
and FTFP’s results with those produced by a standard C library.
4.5.1 Comparison Using Unit of Least Precision
Methodology. We adopt an empirical approach to estimate precision in
terms of Unit of Least Precision (ULP), since formal derivation of maximum
ULP difference requires an intricate understanding of theorem provers and
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floating-point algorithms. We run various floating-point operations on 10,000
randomly generated pairs (using drand48()) of floating-point numbers be-
tween zero and one. For elementary operations, we compare the outputs of
Escort and FTFP with the outputs of native x86 instructions. For all other
operations, we compare the outputs of Escort and FTFP with the outputs
produced by corresponding function from the Musl C library.
Results. We observe that Escort’s results are identical to the results pro-
duced by the reference implementations, i.e. the native (x86) instructions and
the Musl C library. More precisely, the ULP difference between Escort’s re-
sults and reference implementation’s results is zero. On the other hand, FTFP,
which computes arithmetic in fixed-point precision, produces output that dif-
fers substantially from the output of Musl’s double-precision functions (see
Table 4.7). The IEEE 754 standard requires that addition, subtraction, multi-
plication, division, and square root operations are computed with ULP differ-
ence of at most 0.5. Well-known libraries compute results for most higher-level
operations within 1 ULP.
4.5.2 Comparison of Program Output
Methodology. Since differences in program outputs provide an intuitive un-
derstanding of the error introduced by approximate arithmetic operations, we
compare the output of the test suite of Minpack10, a library for solving non-
10https://github.com/devernay/cminpack
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<
10−5
10−5 to
10−3
10−3 to
100
100 to
103
>
103
49% 9% 21% 10% 11%
Table 4.8: Distribution of differences in answers produced by Minpack-FTFP
and Minpack-C. In all, 321 values differ between the outputs of the two
programs.
linear equations and non-linear least squares problems. We generate three vari-
ants of Minpack: Minpack-C uses the standard GNU C library, Minpack-
Escort uses the Escort library, and Minpack-FTFP uses the FTFP library.
We run the 29 programs in Minpack’s test suite and compare the outputs
produced by the three program variants.
Results. We observe that Minpack-Escort produces output that is iden-
tical to Minpack-C’s output. We also observe that all outputs of Minpack-
FTFP differ from Minpack-C. Specifically, 321 values differ between the
outputs of Minpack-FTFP and Minpack-C. We analyze all 321 differences
between Minpack-FTFP and Minpack-C by classifying them into the fol-
lowing five categories: (1) smaller than 10−5, (2) between 10−5 and 10−3, (3)
between 10−3 and 100, (4) between 100 and 103, and (5) larger than 103. As
seen in Table 4.8, almost half of the differences (49%) are extremely small
(less than 10−5), possibly arising from relatively small differences between
fixed-point and floating-point calculations. However, we hypothesize that dif-
ferences amplify from propagation, since nearly 42% of the differences are
larger than 10−3.
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Application
Escort
Overhead
Static (LLVM)
Floating-Point
Instruction
Count
433.milc 29.33× 2,791
444.namd 57.32× 9,647
447.dealII 20.31× 21,963
450.soplex 4.74× 4,177
453.povray 82.53× 25,671
470.lbm 56.19× 711
480.sphinx3 52.46× 629
MEAN
32.63×
(geo. mean)
9,370
(arith. mean)
Table 4.9: Overhead of SPEC-Escort (SPECfp2006 using Escort operations)
relative to SPEC-Libc (SPECfp2006 using libc).
4.6 Performance Evaluation
We now evaluate the end-to-end application performance impact of
Escort’s floating-point library and Escort’s control flow obfuscation.
4.6.1 Impact of Floating-Point Library
This section evaluates the performance impact of Escort on the SPEC
floating point benchmarks, as well as on a security-sensitive program SVMlight,
a machine-learning classifier.
Evaluation Using SPEC Benchmarks. We use the C and C++ floating-
point applications in the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite with reference
inputs. We generate two versions of each program—the first version (SPEC-
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Test Case
Overhead for
Training
Overhead for
Classification
#1 8.66× 1.34×
#2 30.24× 0.96×
#3 1.41× 1.11×
#4 12.75× 0.92×
GEO
MEAN
8.28× 1.07×
Table 4.10: Overhead of Escort on SVMlight program.
Libc) uses the standard C library functions, and the second version (SPEC-
Escort) uses functions from the Escort library11. We compile the SPEC-
Libc program using the Clang/LLVM 3.8 compiler with the -O3 flag, and we
disable auto-vectorization while compiling the SPEC-Escort program. The
following results demonstrate the worst case performance overhead of Escort
for these programs, since we transform all floating-point operations in SPEC-
Escort to use the Escort library. More precisely, we do not reduce the number
of transformations either using taint tracking or using SMT solvers.
Table 4.9 shows that Escort’s overhead is substantial, with a geometric
mean of 32.6×. We expect a lower average overhead for applications that use
secret data, since taint tracking would reduce the number of floating-point
operations that would need to be transformed.
11We also ran the same programs using the FTFP library, but the programs either crashed
due to errors or ran for longer than two hours, after which they were manually terminated.
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Evaluation Using SVMlight. To evaluate Escort’s overhead on a security-
sensitive benchmark, we measure Escort’s performance on SVMlight, an im-
plementation of Support Vector Machines in C, using the four example test
cases documented on the SVMlight website12. We mark the training data and
the classification data as secret. Before replacing floating-point computations,
Escort’s taint analysis discovers all floating-point computations that depend
on the secret data, thus reducing the list of replacements. We also instruct
Escort to query the Z3 SMT solver to determine whether candidate floating-
point computations could use subnormal operands. Escort then replaces these
computations with secure operations from its library. We compile the base-
line (non-secure) program using the Clang/LLVM 3.8 compiler with the -O3
flag, and we disable auto-vectorization while compiling SVMlight with Escort.
We measure the total execution time using the RDTSC instruction. Table 4.10
shows that Escort’s overhead on SVMlight. We observe that Escort’s overhead
on SVMlight is substantially lower than that on SPEC benchmarks. Using the
md5sum program, we verify that the output files before and after transforma-
tion of SVMlight are identical.
4.6.2 Impact of Control Flow Obfuscation
To compare the performance impact of Escort’s control flow obfusca-
tion technique with that of Raccoon, we use the same benchmarks that were
used to evaluate Raccoon [87], while compiling the baseline (non-transformed)
12http://svmlight.joachims.org/
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Benchmark
Raccoon
Overhead
Escort
Overhead
ip-tree 1.01× 2.40×
matrix-mul 1.01× 1.01×
radix-sort 1.01× 1.06×
findmax 1.01× 1.27×
crc32 1.02× 1.00×
genetic-algo 1.03× 1.03×
heap-add 1.03× 1.27×
med-risks 1.76× 1.99×
histogram 1.76× 2.26×
map 2.04× 1.01×
bin-search 11.85× 1.01×
heap-pop 45.40× 1.44×
classifier 53.29× 1.24×
tax 444.36× 1.67×
dijkstra 859.65× 1.10×
GEO MEAN 5.32× 1.32×
Table 4.11: Performance comparison of benchmarks compiled using Raccoon
and Escort. We only compare the control flow obfuscation overhead, since
both Raccoon and Escort use the same technique for data access obfuscation.
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application with the -O3 optimization flag. Although both Escort and Rac-
coon obfuscate control flow and data accesses, we compare the cost of control
flow obfuscation only, since both Escort and Raccoon obfuscate data accesses
using the identical technique. Table 4.11 shows the results.
We find that programs compiled with Escort have a significantly lower
overhead than those compiled with Raccoon. Escort’s geometric mean over-
head is 32%, while that of Raccoon is 5.32×. The worst-case overhead for
Escort is 2.4× (for ip-tree).
The main reason for the vast difference in overhead is that Raccoon
obfuscates branch instructions at execution time, which requires the copying
and restoring of the stack for each branch instruction. Since the stack can
be arbitrarily large, such copying and restoring adds substantial overhead to
the running time of the program. On the other hand, Escort’s code rewriting
technique obfuscates code at compile time using basic block predicates, which
enables significant performance boosts on the above benchmarks.
4.7 Conclusions
In this work, we have presented Escort, a compiler-based tool that
closes side channels that stem from floating-point operations. Escort prevents
an attacker from inferring secret floating-point operands through the timing
channel, though micro-architectural state, and also through off-chip digital
side channels, such as memory address trace.
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Escort uses native SSE instructions to provide speed and precision.
Escort’s compiler-based approach enables it to support a significantly larger
number of floating-point operations (112) than FTFP (19).
Escort’s design motivates further research into hardware support for
side-channel resistant systems. For example, by allowing software to con-
trol the timing of integer instruction latencies and their pipelined execution,
Escort’s guarantees could be extended to instructions beyond floating-point
instructions.
105
Chapter 5
Mitigating Non-Digital Side Channels
In this chapter, we present our research on extending existing power
side channel defenses, so that we can protect a broad class of applications
running on modern microprocessors.
Mechanisms for closing digital side-channels—those that leak discrete
bits of information through entities such as caches, the address trace, and the
branch predictor—have been well studied for a variety of programs and ar-
chitectures [7, 15, 27, 52, 61, 65, 73, 87, 88, 97, 111, 119]. However, as Figure 5.1
shows, existing defenses for analog side channels—such as power, electromag-
netic radiation, and temperature—cannot protect a broad class of programs
running on modern microprocessors. In particular, defenses based on blinding
or masking [11, 16, 22, 26, 36, 45, 46, 59, 75, 78, 81] rely on mathematical prop-
erties of cryptographic computations, so they are not applicable to many im-
portant programs, such as databases, social media platforms, and machine-
learning programs. Approaches that use custom transistors whose power con-
sumption is independent of the data [28, 84, 86, 103, 104] are prohibitively ex-
pensive to scale to an entire modern processor, and they do not protect against
power variations that arise due to microarchitectural optimizations, such as
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Figure 5.1: Relative comparison of power side-channel defenses. Our solu-
tion, Vantage, enables protection for a broad class of applications running
on modern microprocessors, by building on existing techniques like Computa-
tional Blinking or Custom Transistors.
out-of-order execution, caches, or branch predictors. Hardware defenses also
include computational blinking [5], which hides power consumption for short
bursts of time [107, 116], but program behavior can vary so widely that these
solutions are incompatible with complex control and data flow.
For several reasons, compilers would seem to be an ideal tool for de-
fending against side-channel attacks. First, compilers can reason about and
close whole-program information flow, so compilers can eliminate analog side-
channel variations over long sequences of instructions, thereby complementing
existing defenses. Second, compilers offer lower performance overheads than a
possible hardware solution, because they can selectively apply defenses to just
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those parts of the program that manipulate sensitive data. Finally, compilers
can adapt their transformations based on the target processor and all of their
microarchitectural optimizations. Unfortunately, compilers also appear to be
fundamentally ill-suited to closing analog side channels, because compilers tar-
get the instruction set architecture (ISA), a functional interface that hides from
the compiler the very implementation details—the analog channels—that we
wish to regulate.
This work explains how compilers can in fact be used to close analog
side channels—specifically the power side channel—for a broad class of applica-
tions running on x64, ARM 32, and ARM 64 processors. Our key idea is to use
a power model1 to intentionally change a microprocessor’s power consumption
through program execution. In essence, the power model helps us selectively
break the ISA barrier, allowing our compiler—the Vantage compiler—to de-
liberately change the program’s power consumption for the sake of closing the
power channel over long sequences of instructions.
Vantage can be viewed as a system for analyzing and translating pro-
grams to a new abstract domain—the power domain—which allows compilers
to reason about the power consumption of the program. More broadly, the
key ideas behind Vantage can be used to build compilers for similar abstract
domains for the purpose of closing other side channels.
Our compiler is not tied to any particular power model, so it can be
1Power models characterize a microprocessor’s power consumption based on microarchi-
tectural events such as instruction count, cache misses, etc.
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customized to use more precise and accurate power models as they become
available. To illustrate the flexibility of our approach, we evaluate versions of
the Vantage compiler that use two very different power models—the open-
source McPAT [58] model and the closed-source Intel Running Average Power
Limit (RAPL) [29] model. We make no claims that McPAT and RAPL are
the best possible power models. Indeed, there has been a long history in
the development of increasingly-accurate power models [17, 48, 58, 92, 102, 120],
and our key contribution is the approach for augmenting compilers with power
models to close analog side channels.
This work makes the following contributions:
1. Importance of Closing Power Channels on Modern Processors
for a Variety of Programs. We argue that current techniques are lim-
ited because they do not protect complex programs running on existing
commercial hardware.
2. Use of Power Models to Transcend the ISA Barrier. We ob-
serve that because power models link digital events to analog behavior,
a compiler can selectively use a power model to peek through the ISA to
modulate power consumption, thereby closing power channels over long
sequences of instructions.
3. Compilers for Two Distinct Power Models. We introduce the
Vantage compiler that complements existing techniques to close the
power channel in a broad variety of applications running on modern
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Label #1
(Malicious Packet)
Label #2
(Benign Packet)
Mean 2003.0 1893.1
Stdev 29.8 30.8
Table 5.1: Energy consumption (measured using Intel RAPL) while running
the LibSVM classifier [20] that labels data from the KDD Cup dataset [10].
We observe that energy consumption is a reasonable indicator of the label of
the input data.
processors. We evaluate Vantage using two power models, one an open-
source model (McPAT) that explicitly exposes power leakage and the
second, a closed-source model (RAPL) from which we stastically identify
power leaks.
4. Security and Performance Evaluation. We show that Vantage
protects otherwise vulnerable programs. Depending on the underlying
power model and the target microprocessor, Vantage imposes a mean
slowdown from a few percent to about 7×, which is 33× to 137× more
efficient than a baseline hardware-only solution.
5.1 Motivation
In this section, we explain the importance of closing the power channel
for a broad class of applications running on modern processors.
Power side channels leak secret information through not just arithmetic
and logic operations, but also through branches, memory accesses, and through
microarchitectural optimizations. Table 5.1 shows, for two secret inputs passed
110
Power Consumption of Non−Secure Execution #1 (~2.1W)
Power Consumption of Secure Executions: #1 and #2 (~2.1W)
Power Consumption of Non−Secure Execution: #2 (~1.9W)1.9
2.0
2.1
0 50 100
Time (microseconds)
D
yn
am
ic 
Po
w
e
r 
(W
a
tts
)
Figure 5.2: Power consumption of the LibSVM classifier before and after using
our solution (measured using McPAT). The non-secure executions (shown in
red and orange), produce a visually distinct profile of power consumption,
whereas after using our solution, for all secrets, the power profiles are identical
(shown as a single line in blue), effectively mitigating the power channel attack.
to the LibSVM classifier [20], the total energy consumption measured using
Intel RAPL [29]. We see that when running the classifier on a reference net-
work intrusion dataset [10], there exists a correlation between the processor’s
energy consumption and the classification of network packets as either benign
or malicious. Thus, we see that an adversary can infer the packet label by
simply observing differences in the processor’s energy consumption.
In addition to the total energy consumption, the profile of the energy
consumption depends on the inputs as well, enabling the adversary to infer
the secret through just a partial observation of the program execution. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows that the power consumption (measured using the McPAT power
modeling framework [58]) during a 140µs time window differs between the two
non-secure executions (shown in red and orange), where one execution pro-
duces more peaks than the other. Thus, we see that the power channel is
111
dangerous and easy to exploit, in applications that may operate on private or
confidential information.
5.2 Open-Source Power Model: McPAT
To be able to close the power channel, we first need to understand how
source code can affect the power consumption. In the following sections, we
describe our analysis of the McPAT power model, our steps to validate the
analysis results, and finally, the code transformations for eliminating power
variations.
5.2.1 Analysis of McPAT
To understand the impact of source code on power consumption, we
analyze the power model, the microarchitectural simulator whose events drive
the power model, and the compiler backend whose instructions trigger events
in the microarchitecture. From our analysis of the McPAT power model, we
find that it estimates the processor’s power consumption based on the pro-
cessor’s physical characteristics (e.g. supply voltage), its features (e.g. cache
sizes), and its microarchitectural events (e.g. cache hits and misses). Since the
processor’s physical characteristics and its features are constant for the pro-
gram lifetime, we focus our effort on the impact of microarchitectural events on
power consumption. We then find the assembly instructions whose operands
may cause variations in the microarchitectural events produced by the Gem5
simulator, by analyzing the microcode and exceptions for the x64, ARM 32,
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and ARM 64 microprocessors and also the common portions of the microar-
chitectures such as out-of-order execution, caches, and TLBs. Finally, we
analyze the translation of LLVM IR instructions into assembly programs to
understand the impact of IR instruction operands on power consumption. Al-
though we perform this analysis manually, existing static analysis techniques
such as Information Flow Analysis [32] can be used to derive the same results.
5.2.2 Our Findings
Across all three targets (x64, ARM 32 and ARM 64), we find that
branch instructions and memory accesses induce variations in power consump-
tion due to their effect on the fetched instructions and the cache usage. In the
following paragraphs, we describe computational instructions whose execution
induces power variations.
Vulnerable Instructions for x64 Target. We find that 22 instructions
(see Table 5.2) on x64 processors execute varying number of microcode op-
erations depending on their operands, thus affecting the power consumption.
Among these, 19 instructions are either used only in kernel mode (thus being
outside of Vantage’s threat model) or are rarely used in code generated by
modern compilers (e.g. string instructions). Hence, we focus our attention on
the remaining three instructions (IDIV, BSF, and BSR).
Vulnerable Instructions for ARM 32 Target. We find that predicated
instructions on ARM 32 (generated by LLVM for compare and select IR
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Instruction
Reason for executing variable
number of micro operations
ENTER Value of the nesting depth
MOV
If the register operand is a
segment selector register
LODS, STOS,
SCAS, CMPS,
MOVS, INS, OUTS
If instructions are prefixed
with REP
IDIV Value of dividend (RAX)
JMP, RET
If processor executes far
jump or far return
IRET
If processor returns to
virtual 8086 mode
INT, INT3 If processor is in long mode
BSR, BSF
Early termination if input is
zero
CMPXCHG8B,
CMPXCHG16B
Early termination if EAX
or RAX does not match
with m64 or m128 respectively
LLDT
Early termination if
invalid operand
PSRLDQ,
PSLLDQ
Value of immediate
(constant) operand
Table 5.2: x64 instructions whose operand values trigger variable number of
microcode operations.
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instructions) can cause variations in power consumption depending on their
operands, and that various software runtime library functions (e.g. integer
division) cause variations in power consumption due to their use of conditional
branches and predicated instructions. For processors with software floating-
point ABI, we find that the elementary floating-point operations (i.e. add, sub,
mul, div, and sqrt) and conversion operations between integer and floating-
point numbers use conditional branches and predicated instructions, causing
the inputs to create variations in power consumption.
5.2.3 Validation of the Analysis Results
We validate the results of the above analysis using randomized testing,
where our goal is to check whether there exist other sources of variations in the
power consumption, beyond the ones that we discovered. We thus use several
different inputs to execute randomly-generated instruction sequences that our
previous analysis concluded as safe from power variations, and we observe the
power profile of the instruction sequences across the different inputs. If our
manual analysis is incorrect (i.e. if additional instructions exist whose power
consumption varies with the input), we expect to see differences in the power
profile when the input values differ.
Validation for x64 Target. We implement this experiment for the x64
platform using the Intel XED (X86 Encoder Decoder) library2. From the
2https://intelxed.github.io/
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roughly 400 instructions supported by the Gem5 simulator, our test generator
emits 277 instructions (187 SSE instruction and 90 integer instructions). The
instructions not emitted by our randomized tests include 71 x87 (coproces-
sor) instructions, 38 ring 0 (or system management) instructions, 17 branch
instructions, and 7 string instructions; we do not include these instructions in
our randomized test since they are either removed by our compiler during the
code transformation or because these instructions are not used or rarely used
in modern user-level code. Our randomized test generates instructions using
five addressing modes, whenever supported by the instructions: immediate
mode, register mode, indirect mode, base-relative mode, and offset-scaled-
base-relative mode. Each instruction sequence is 1,000 instructions long, and
in each execution we iterate 10,000 times over the generated instruction se-
quence. At every 1µs, we measure the power consumption, and we find that
regardless of the operand values used in the instruction sequence, all executions
produce an identical power profile.
Since the Intel XED library does not support encoding instructions
for ARM 32 and ARM 64 microprocessors, we are currently in the process
of manually encoding instruction mnemonics to port this experiment to the
ARM platforms.
5.2.4 Design of the Vantage Compiler
Armed with the list of instruction that may induce power variations,
we then devise code transformations of Vantage. Fortunately, many trans-
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Figure 5.3: Dependences among runtime components for compiling programs
using Vantage.
formed operations can be generated incrementally using the Vantage com-
piler themselves, thus eliminating the need to manually write all transformed
operations in assembly code. As Figure 5.3 shows, we only need a handful
of operations in assembly code, while the Vantage compiler generates the
remaining operations from C code and the handwritten assembly code. Using
the Vantage compiler, we also transform the Berkeley SoftFloat library3 for
elementary floating-point operations (32- and 64-bit floating-point addition,
subtraction, multiplication, division, and square root) and Musl C library4 for
higher-level floating-point operations (sine, cosine, logarithm, and other sim-
ilar operations). Finally, these transformed components are linked with the
transformed version of the benchmarks to produce the executable file.
The Vantage compiler first applies inter-procedural, flow-sensitive,
3http://www.jhauser.us/arithmetic/SoftFloat.html
4https://www.musl-libc.org
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and context-insensitive taint propagation to identify instructions that use sen-
sitive values. Vantage relies on the programmer to identify those variables
that store sensitive inputs. The Vantage compiler then removes or replaces
instructions that may operate on sensitive information and which may leak the
sensitive information through power consumption. Vantage borrows a trans-
formation from the Escort [88] compiler, which closes digital side channels, and
we briefly illustrate this transformation below. Vantage also includes new
transformations that are not present in the other compilers.
Transformation of Tainted store Instructions. Vantage replaces store
instructions with predicated write operations, whose predicate controls whether
the operation writes new data or pre-existing data. Most importantly, the
predicated write operation uses bitwise operations in place of the conditional
branch, so that the value of the predicate does not cause variations in the power
consumption. Figure 5.4 shows the assembly code for the X64, ARM 32, and
ARM 64 targets.
Transformation of Tainted branch Instructions. Similar to the Escort
compiler, Vantage performs standard if-conversion by replacing conditional
branches with unconditional branches, while also predicating the instructions
along the conditionally-execute path using the predicated write operation de-
scribed above. Vantage also transforms loops by unrolling them a fixed
number of times, as specified by the programmer’s annotation. Vantage
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01: pred_write(uint8_t cond, uint32_t __t, uint32_t __f) {
02: uint32_t ret, tmp;
03: __asm__ volatile (
04: #if defined(__aarch64__)
05: "tst %w[con], #0xff;"
06: "csel %w[ret], %w[f], %w[t], eq;"
07: #else
08: #if defined(__arm__)
09: "neg %[tmp], %[con];"
10: "and %[ret], %[tmp], %[t];"
11: "mvn %[tmp], %[tmp];"
12: "and %[tmp], %[tmp], %[f];"
13: "orr %[ret], %[ret], %[tmp];"
14: #else
15: #if defined(__x86_64__)
16: "mov %[t], %[ret];"
17: "test %[con], %[con];"
18: "cmove %[f], %[ret];"
19: #endif
20: #endif
21: #endif
22: : [ret] "=&r" (ret), [tmp] "=&r" (tmp)
23: : [con] "r" (cond), [t] "r" (__t),
24: [f] "r" (__f)
25: : "cc" );
26: return ret;
27: }
Figure 5.4: Conditional move operation for x64, ARM 32, and ARM 64. The
code does not leak the secret condition through power consumption.
computes predicates for basic blocks whose execution depends on the tainted
branch, by propagating branch predicates along the edges of the CFG, before
rewriting only those instructions in the conditional blocks that may cause side
effects.
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Transformation of Tainted Pointer Dereferences. Since memory ac-
cesses affect the usage of the processor cache, which affects the power con-
sumption, Vantage replaces sensitive pointer dereferences with accesses that
forcibly bypass the cache. We implement such accesses by modifying the Gem5
simulator, and our implementation adds the correct latency from such memory
accesses to the program’s execution time. Such accesses can also be imple-
mented in software using uncacheable memory.
01: uint32_t bit_scan_forward(uint32_t input) {
02: uint8_t n = 1;
03: if ((input & 0xffff) == 0) {
04: n += 16; input >>= 16; }
05: if ((input & 0x00ff) == 0) {
06: n += 8; input >>= 8; }
07: if ((input & 0x000f) == 0) {
08: n += 4; input >>= 4; }
09: if ((input & 0x0003) == 0) {
10: n += 2; input >>= 2; }
11: if (input == 0) {
12: return 0; }
13: return n + ((input + 1) & 0x01);
Figure 5.5: C Code for bit scan forward operation that is later transformed
using the Vantage compiler.
Transformation of Other Instructions. We implement software versions
of BSF and BSR (see Figure 5.5) and a binary version of long division IDIV (see
Figure 5.6), all of which execute using a fixed number of microcode operations,
after transformation using Vantage. For transforming comparison operations
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01: udivrem_32(uint32_t numerator, uint32_t denominator,
02: uint32_t* quotient, uint32_t* remainder) {
03: uint32_t __quo = 0, __rem = 0;
04: int32_t i;
05: for (i = sizeof(uint32_t) * 8 - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
06: __rem <<= 1;
07: uint8_t q_bit = 1,num_i = (numerator >> i) & 1;
08: __rem |= num_i;
09: if (__rem >= denominator) {
10: __rem -= denominator;
11: } else {
12: q_bit = (__quo >> i) & 1;
13: }
14: __quo |= (q_bit << i);
15: }
16: if (quotient != NULL) {
17: *quotient = __quo; }
18: if (remainder != NULL) {
19: *remainder = __rem; }
20: }
Figure 5.6: C Code for unsigned integer division that is later transformed
using the Vantage compiler. We mark the numerator and the denominator
inputs as secret.
on the ARM 32 target, we use the GNU Superoptimizer5 for discovering al-
ternative instruction sequences that are functionally equivalent to the integer
comparison operations, and we port the results of the GNU Superoptimizer
from PowerPC to ARM 32 assembly code (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8 for exam-
ples). Using the X64 and ARM 32 ISA specifications as reference, we use the
CVC4 SMT solver [9] to prove that these transformed operations produce the
correct output. For floating-point comparisons, we use transformed code from
the Berkeley SoftFloat library. Finally, Vantage replaces the select IR in-
5https://github.com/embecosm/gnu-superopt
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01: uint8_t cmp_ne(uint32_t x, uint32_t y) {
02: #if defined(__arm__)
03: register uint32_t ret, tmp;
04: __asm__ volatile (
05: "sub %[t], %[x], %[y];"
06: "sub %[r], %[y], %[x];"
07: "orr %[r], %[r], %[t];"
08: "lsr %[r], %[r], #31;"
09: : [r] "=r" (ret), [t] "=&r" (tmp)
10: : [x] "r" (x), [y] "r" (y)
11: : "cc" );
12: return ret & 1;
13: #else
14: return x != y;
15: #endif
16: }
}
Figure 5.7: Not-equals comparison without causing power variations.
struction with a transformed comparison operation followed by the predicated
write operation. For the ARM 32 microprocessor with a software floating-point
ABI, we use transformed versions of 32- and 64-bit floating-point operations
from the Berkeley SoftFloat library. We ensure that the transformed oper-
ations do not throw exceptions, since exceptions may reveal the instruction
predicate through abnormal termination.
5.3 Closed-Source Power Model: RAPL
We now illustrate the key steps for extending our prior design of the
Vantage compiler based on Intel RAPL, which is a closed-source power
model. Our high-level approach is to create a regression model between mi-
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01: uint8_t cmp_ugt(uint32_t x, uint32_t y) {
02: #if defined(__arm__)
03: register uint32_t ret;
04: __asm__ volatile (
05: "subs %[r], %[y], %[x];"
06: "sbc %[r], %[r], %[r];"
07: "neg %[r], %[r];"
08: : [r] "=r" (ret)
09: : [x] "r" (x), [y] "r" (y)
10: : "cc" );
11: return ret;
12: #else
13: return x > y;
14: #endif
15: }
}
Figure 5.8: Unsigned greater-than comparison without causing power varia-
tions.
croarchitectural events and power consumption6, and we use the model to
determine instructions that may leak information through power consump-
tion.
5.3.1 A Regression Model that Approximates RAPL
We construct a flexible regression model whose precision can be con-
trolled using a tuning parameter. Unlike previous regression models for power
consumption [13, 24, 40, 41, 98, 113], the coefficients in our regression model
(based on the Elastic Net regression technique [124]) depend on a parameter
6Indeed, correlation identified by the regression model does not imply causation. How-
ever, constructing our compiler-based defense using correlation (instead of causation) does
not alter our solution’s security guarantees, although it worsens the performance impact
since the compiler is forced to control a larger set of microarchitectural events.
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λ, which enables a tradeoff between the precision and the simplicity of the
regression model. More precisely, the value of λ affects the number of zero
coefficients (i.e. coefficients whose value is zero), which indicates that the cor-
responding microarchitectural events have no impact on the estimated power
consumption. So a model with more zero coefficients reduces the number of
microarchitectural events that need to be controlled using our compiler, effec-
tively reducing the performance overhead of our defense. At the same time,
however, a model with more zero coefficients can also be imprecise, since fewer
microarchitectural events are used to estimate power. This tradeoff between
precision and the number of zero coefficients is crucial since it allows us to
construct a defense that is tailored to the desired threat model and to the
performance envelope.
Our regression model for our test platform (an Intel x86 Haswell pro-
cessor) uses 21 raw performance events (see Table 5.3) that form a superset
of the microarchitectural events that can be controlled using the x86 ISA. We
use programs from the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite with training in-
puts, and we run them to completion while measuring performance and power
every 100 ms, resulting in ≈420,000 measurements. Since our x86 processor
supports the measurement of only four simultaneous performance events, we
run each SPEC program 21 times, measuring one performance event in each
instance of the execution.
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Type
Performance
Event
Coeff.
for λmin
Coeff.
for λthr
Instr-
uction
Branch Inst. 1.3×10−09 1.3×10−09
Mispred. Br. 8.9×10−09 3.0×10−09
Executed u-ops 4.8×10−11 5.3×10−11
Issued u-ops 7.5×10−11 1.0×10−10
CPU Clock 8.3×10−11 2.5×10−11
Retired Inst. 1.2×10−10 7.0×10−11
Mem.
Access
DTLB LD Miss 4.3×10−08 0
DTLB ST Miss 0 0
ITLB Miss 1.5×10−06 8.6×10−07
ICache Read 2.4×10−10 2.0×10−10
ICache Miss 9.2×10−09 1.1×10−08
L1 Cache Hit 8.4×10−11 2.8×10−11
L2 Cache Hit 1.2×10−08 8.0×10−09
L3 Cache Hit 0 0
L1 Cache Miss 0 0
L2 Cache Miss 0 0
L3 Cache Miss 0 0
Math
Op.
Arith. u-ops 3.0×10−10 0
AVX Inst 0 0
AVX to SSE
Transitions
0 0
SSE to AVX
Transitions
0 0
—
Intercept
(Avg Energy)
1.1 1.2
Table 5.3: The 21 chosen performance events for computing the regression
between microarchitectural events and energy consumption and their corre-
sponding coefficients (after rounding to one decimal).
125
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
  0    0    0    0    0    0  
  1  
  1  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  3  
  4  
  4  
  4  
  4  
  4  
  4  
  5  
  5  
  5  
  5  
  5  
  5  
  6  
  7  
  8  
  11  
  12  
  12  
  13  
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
−4 −3 −2 −1 0log(λmin) log(λthr)
log(λ)
R
oo
t M
ea
n 
Sq
ua
re
 E
rro
r (
RM
SE
) in
 P
red
ict
ion
 (J
ou
les
)
Figure 5.9: The prediction error increases as λ increases beyond λmin, which
produces the smallest prediction error. We are interested in the value of λ for
which the prediction error is close to the smallest prediction error. Digits on
the curve indicate the number of non-zero coefficients for the corresponding
values of λ.
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Tradeoff Between Simplicity and Precision. We select the value of λ,
whose value affects the number of non-zero coefficients, after measuring its
impact on the prediction error, which is strictly convex, thus permitting an
iterative approach to discover the value of λ that results in the smallest pre-
diction error. Figure 5.9 shows the prediction error after using cross-validation
on the SPEC CPU 2006 measurements. The digits on the curve indicate the
number of non-zero coefficients. We observe that when λ = λmin = 0.00013,
the Root Mean Square (RMS) prediction error is close to 25 mJ, and that
the cross validation error continues to be under the 25 mJ threshold until
λ = λthr = 0.00413.
5.3.2 Validation of the Analysis Results
We validate the accuracy of the regression coefficients for both λ =
λmin and λ = λthr regression models by predicting the energy consumption
of the processor while it executes the PARSEC benchmark applications [12].
Table 5.4 shows the prediction accuracy, computed using the RMS error for
every 100 ms of program execution. The prediction accuracy of our regression
models is higher than 96%, so we believe that our models are sufficiently
accurate.
5.3.3 Design of the Vantage Compiler for Intel RAPL
By leveraging the flexibility of our regression model, we create a power
channel defense for λ = λthr, and we call the corresponding solution as Van-
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Benchmark
Accuracy of
Model when
λ = λmin
Accuracy of
Model when
λ = λthr
blackscholes 98.96 % 97.19 %
bodytrack 94.92 % 95.28 %
canneal 96.72 % 96.15 %
facesim 97.72 % 98.21 %
ferret 98.06 % 95.52 %
fluidanimate 97.03 % 97.30 %
freqmine 94.61 % 95.85 %
raytrace 96.23 % 97.14 %
streamcluster 96.46 % 95.74 %
vips 98.84 % 96.72 %
Geo. Mean 96.75 % 96.51 %
Table 5.4: Accuracy of the new regression models based on 100 ms mea-
surements of a subset of the PARSEC benchmarks using Intel RAPL. The
remaining benchmarks failed to either compile or run on our platform.
tage-RAPL. The Vantage-RAPL compiler extends the Vantage compiler,
by ignoring the transformation of TLB events, since the data TLB coefficients
are equal to zero. Specifically, Vantage-RAPL forces cache misses on every
access to a secret address using the clflush instruction. Such accesses can
also be implemented using uncacheable memory.
5.4 Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of our code transformations using
microbenchmarks (which test integer division, bit scan operations, and inte-
ger and floating-point comparisons), and we also evaluate the security and
performance of our full benchmarks.
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5.4.1 Experimental Setup
Vantage uses the LLVM compiler [55] version 7.0 for transforming
programs. For Intel RAPL measurements, we gather performance and en-
ergy measurements every 100 ms on an 8-core Intel Haswell processor clocked
at 3.4 GHz. The processor contains 32 KB private L1 instruction and data
caches, 256 KB private L2 unified caches, and a shared 8 MB unified L3 cache.
The processor runs Ubuntu 16.04 with Linux kernel version 4.4.0. For mea-
surements based on McPAT, we gather performance and power measurements
every 1µs using the Gem5 microarchitectural simulator that models 1 GHz
out-of-order x64, ARM 32, and ARM 64 processors with 32 KB L1 instruction
and data caches, a 256 KB L2 cache, and an 8 MB L3 cache. As a reference for
performance comparison of Vantage, we use a hypothetical hardware-only
defense that does not use contextual information from a compiler like Van-
tage, forcing the processor to consume worst-case power and execution time
for every operation. Our hardware-only defense consumes 1 cycle for arith-
metic operations, 2 cycles for branches, 3 cycles for CALL instructions, and 400
cycles for memory references7.
5.4.2 Performance of Microbenchmarks
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 evaluate the performance impact of Vantage’s
microprocessor-specific code transformations. We observe that the slowdowns
are substantial, especially for the bitscan operations, but these instructions do
7https://www.agner.org/optimize/instruction_tables.pdf
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Figure 5.10: Performance overhead of transformed 32-bit division, remainder,
and bit scan code on the x64 target.
not dominate the dynamic instruction count in the benchmark applications,
so their impact on the performance of the full applications is relatively low.
5.4.3 Benchmark Applications
We now evaluate the security and performance of Vantage on x64,
ARM 32, and ARM 64 targets with McPAT-based and RAPL-based mea-
surements using 12 benchmarks. Since there are no standardized benchmarks
for evaluating side channel defenses, we use commonly used programs whose
inputs represent private or confidential information. These benchmarks rep-
resent applications from four diverse categories: (1) general user applications
(comprising of a Font Renderer8, a Hash Table implementation9, and a Bloom
Filter implementation10), (2) machine-learning kernels (comprising of Dis-
8https://github.com/nothings/stb/blob/master/stb_easy_font.h
9https://github.com/watmough/jwHash
10https://github.com/bitly/dablooms
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Figure 5.11: Performance overhead of transformed 32-bit division, remainder,
and comparison on ARM 32 target.
parity Map computer vision benchmark [109], the LibSVM Support Vector
Machine Classifier11, and an implementation of the K-Means clustering algo-
rithm12), (3) graph kernels (which includes an implementation of Top-k Search,
the Bellman-Ford shortest path algorithm, and the Pagerank algorithm), and
(4) cryptographic kernels (the Microsoft Lattice Cryptography Library13, a
Curve25519 elliptic curve implementation14, and a Poly1305 message authen-
tication code implementation15). Nine of the total 12 benchmarks are written
by third party developers. For each application, we mark its inputs as se-
cret, and we use at least three distinct inputs for each application. We use
smaller data sizes for McPAT-based measurements since McPAT-based sim-
11https://github.com/cjlin1/libsvm
12https://wikicoding.org/wiki/c/k-means_clustering_algorithm/
13https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/project/
lattice-cryptography-library
14https://github.com/agl/curve25519-donna
15https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
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ulations run many times slower than RAPL-based executions. Our compiler
detects vulnerabilities in, and accordingly transforms, all applications except
the cryptographic kernels, since, as per our power models, the cryptographic
kernels do not include instructions that leak information.
We emphasize that the evaluation results are closely tied to each power
model, so results from one power model are not directly comparable with
results from the other power model.
Hypothetical Hardware−Only Defense            Vantage                  
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ARM 32 with Software Floating−Point Support
Figure 5.12: Performance overhead of Vantage on x64, ARM 32, and
ARM 64 targets.
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5.4.3.1 Security Evaluation
Methodology for McPAT-Based Measurements. Our McPAT-based
measurements are obtained using the Gem5 simulator, enabling precisely re-
producible results on every execution. To determine whether the power trace
of the transformed programs is independent of the secrets, we compute the
SHA1 checksum for the power trace obtained using Gem5 and McPAT, and
we check whether the checksums are exactly identical even when the secret
inputs differ. If identical, we conclude that the power trace is independent of
the secrets.
Results for McPAT-Based Measurements. For all but the cryptographic
benchmarks, we observe that the non-secure execution produces a different
SHA1 checksum (elided for space) for each secret input, whereas programs
transformed using Vantage produce exactly identical SHA1 checksums of
the power traces regardless of the programs’ secret inputs. Indeed, as per
our power model analysis, the cryptographic kernels do not use vulnerable
instructions that leak secrets.
Methodology for RAPL Measurements. We collect 50 power profiles
for every combination of the application and the secret input, and we feed
these profiles to an Extreme Gradient Boosting classifier, which we implement
using the xgboost [21] R package. We first randomly shuﬄe the power profiles,
before using one-third of the profiles for training the classifier. We measure the
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Benchmark
Application
Non-Secure
Execution
AUC
Vantage
Execution
AUC
Hash Table 0.91 +/- 0.02 0.50 +/- 0.03
Disparity Map 0.85 +/- 0.03 0.49 +/- 0.04
LibSVM Classifier 0.93 +/- 0.02 0.48 +/- 0.04
Top-k Search 0.94 +/- 0.02 0.45 +/- 0.05
Page Rank 0.92 +/- 0.02 0.50 +/- 0.05
Bellman Ford 0.99 +/- 0.01 0.51 +/- 0.05
Font Renderer 0.53 +/- 0.05 0.46 +/- 0.05
Bloom Filter 0.46 +/- 0.04 0.49 +/- 0.04
K-Means Clustering 0.55 +/- 0.05 0.49 +/- 0.05
Lattice Cryto Key Exch. 0.45 +/- 0.05 0.51 +/- 0.05
Curve25519 ECC 0.51 +/- 0.05 0.42 +/- 0.05
Poly1305 MAC 0.47 +/- 0.05 0.44 +/- 0.05
Table 5.5: Mean Area Under the Curve (AUC) and standard deviation for
ROC curves corresponding to non-secure and secure (Vantage) execution
over 500 summaries. We observe that six benchmark applications are vul-
nerable to power channel attacks, and Vantage thwarts the attack in the
transformed (Vantage) execution.
accuracy of the classification on the remaining two-thirds of the profiles using
the Area Under the Curve (AUC) metric of the Receiver Operating Charac-
teristic (ROC) Curve. The random shuﬄing step perturbs the classification
accuracy on each execution, so we perform the classification 500 times and if
the mean AUC is close to 0.5, then we conclude that the adversary is unsuc-
cessful at launching a power channel attack. Consequently, if the mean AUC
for programs transformed using Vantage drops close to 0.5, then we conclude
that Vantage successfully defeats the power channel attack.
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Figure 5.13: Performance overhead of Vantage-RAPL.
Results for RAPL Measurements. Table 5.5 shows the Area Under the
Curve (AUC) metric for ROC curves for the original and transformed pro-
grams using Intel RAPL measurements. We find that 6 of the 12 benchmarks
(shown in the top half of the table) are vulnerable to power channel attacks.
In particular, we observe that benchmarks whose dynamic instruction count
depends on the secrets are more susceptible to power channel attacks using
RAPL, while benchmarks whose memory address trace depends on the secrets
are harder to attack. We observe that programs transformed using Vantage-
RAPL thwart the power channel attack.
5.4.3.2 Performance Evaluation
Results for McPAT Measurements. Figure 5.12 compares the perfor-
mance overhead of programs running on the hardware-only defense versus
that of programs transformed by Vantage. Since the hardware-only defense
lacks contextual information about the program, it needs to treat every op-
135
eration as secret, thus forcing the worst-case execution time for every oper-
ation. In contrast, programs transformed using the Vantage compiler can
transform only those sections of the code that may leak secrets, thus execut-
ing programs two to three orders of magnitude faster than the hardware-only
defense. Among programs transformed by Vantage, we observe that bench-
marks that access memory using secret pointers (Font Renderer and Top-k)
incur high overhead. We also find that on the ARM 32 target with software
floating-point ABI, benchmarks that use floating-point arithmetic (LibSVM,
K-Means, and Pagerank) experience substantial overheads due to their use of
software floating-point arithmetic. The Top-k application uses many compar-
isons (again, implemented in Vantage in software), which results in higher
overhead on the ARM 32 targets compared to the ARM 64 target. Across all
analyzed targets, we find that the mean overhead from using Vantage is at
most 3×, while that from using a hardware-only defense ranges between 99×
and 141×.
Results for RAPL Measurements. Figure 5.13 shows the performance
overhead of programs transformed by Vantage-RAPL, where we observe that
benchmarks which access memory using secret pointers (Font Renderer and
Top-k) or which perform floating-point arithmetic on secret values (LibSVM,
K-Means, and Pagerank) experience the most slowdowns. These results vali-
date our understanding that Vantage’s transformation of control flow is sub-
stantially cheaper than its transformation of memory references and floating-
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point computation, since it is more expensive to force cache misses or to per-
form dummy subnormal floating-point computation compared to executing
dummy instructions. On average, we see a 6× slowdown from the use of
Vantage-RAPL.
5.5 Discussion
Performance Overhead of Vantage. The performance overhead of Van-
tage stems from its strong security property of making the running time of the
application independent of the secrets, so as to not leak information through
the total energy consumption. Like Vantage, any solution that enforces a
fixed energy consumption will need to enforce a worst-case execution time.
However, we believe that Vantage’s performance overhead can be reduced
using aggressive compiler optimizations combined with modest microarchitec-
tural changes.
Accuracy of Power Models. Vantage’s defense relies crucially on the
accuracy of the power model. However, many power models exist whose pre-
dictions are close to the actual power consumption [17, 48, 58, 92, 102, 120].
Vantage is not tied to any specific power models; instead Vantage can be
adapted based on the available power model.
Other Physical Side Channels. Beyond power, there exist systems that
model other aspects of the program execution such as heat [38, 39] and elec-
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tromagnetic radiation [57, 122], so our approach could be useful for mitigating
other analog side channel attacks besides power channel attacks.
5.6 Conclusion and Future Work
Until now, power channel defenses have protected a small minority of
programs. This work shows how compiler-based techniques can be used to
close power side channels in a more diverse class of applications running on
modern processors. The key observation is that to bridge the gap between
the program execution and the power consumption, we need a mapping from
software events to power consumption, which can be provided by existing
power models.
By mapping software events to power consumption, Vantage can elim-
inate variations in all software events—and only those software events—that
affect power consumption. At the same time, by reasoning about power con-
sumption at the program level, Vantage can selectively apply mitigation
techniques only where needed.
Looking to the future, we can combine our compiler-based code trans-
formations with existing cycle-level power side-channel defenses to provide a
comprehensive power channel defense. We also plan to improve the perfor-
mance impact of our solutions through microarchitectural enhancements.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we presented compiler-based solutions for closing
or mitigating digital as well as non-digital side channels. Our solutions require
programmer annotations that identify the input variables that hold sensitive
information, and the compiler tracks the flow of sensitive information through
various instructions, so that it transforms only those parts of the program that
operate on sensitive values. Our solutions also adapt the code transformations
based on the threat model as well as the microarchitecture.
Our solutions use the key insight that a broad class of side channels
arise due to variations in the application’s source-level behavior, which can
be summarized in terms of control flows and data flows. Consequently, by
making the application’s control flows and data flows independent of the pro-
gram’s sensitive information, our solutions close a broad class of side channels.
But side channels can also exist in the implementation of individual assembly
instructions, such as the integer division instruction, which can leak informa-
tion about the operands through the running time, architectural exceptions,
and through power consumption. For closing such side channels, our solu-
tions rewrite the operation without using the vulnerable assembly instruction.
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For instance, our Vantage solution rewrites the division instruction using
only bitwise arithmetic operations. We derive the rewritten operations either
manually or by using results from an existing superoptimizer.
6.1 Future Work
We now list potential topics for extending this work.
Synthesizing Side-Channel Defenses. Based on our generalized approach
for closing side channels through abstractions from program instructions
to side-channel leakage, it could be possible to synthesize compiler trans-
formations automatically based on microarchitectural models of informa-
tion leakage. Synthesis techniques can also be useful for proving stronger
guarantees through a rich domain-specific language that is amenable to
aggressive static analysis, such as determining whether the generated
code transformations are composable with other compiler transforma-
tions or whether the generated code transformations preseve program
correctness.
Extending the ISA to Include Behavioral Constraints. Currently, the
only way for a compiler to affect the microarchitecture’s behavior is
through the ISA, which is a functional interface and which does not in-
clude a specification of behavioral properties such as power consumption
or timing. Consequently, software solutions are often forced to craft
clever but fragile techniques for influencing microarchitectural behavior,
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often resulting in large performance overheads. By extending the ISA to
include not just functional but also a behavioral specification, software
can directly control the microarchitecture’s behavioral properties, thus
likely improving performance.
Creating a Standardized Benchmark for Evaluating Defenses. Finally,
various side channel defenses exist, but it is difficult to compare these
defenses against each other because of the lack of a set of programs that
can be used as a standardized benchmark. By designing a reference
benchmark suite, we can enable a direct comparison of not just the per-
formance impact of various solutions but also their purported security
on different programs running on various platforms.
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